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This dissertation is about legal and moral obli-
gation. In response to the skeptic who questions a) whether
there are any obligations at all and/or b) whether particular
claims about obligations in particular situations are true,
an argument will be advanced affirming the existence of cer-
tain societal obligations. These societal obligations are
moral obligations and recognition of them is required for
demonstrating the legitimacy of the exercise of power by
legal institutions.
The theories of obligation of H.A. Prichard and
W.D. Ross will be criticized. These theories neglect cer-
tain dimensions of obligation and do not provide an adequate
response to certain forms of skepticism about obligation.
Cases in Anglo-American contract law will be presented to
reveal the way courts justify imposing obligations on parties
in lawsuits. An argument justifying the procedure of the
courts will bring to light the societal obligations which
are basic to other types of obligation. The theory of obli-
gation will then be tested by applying it to situations in
which questions about obligation arise. The example of
Socrates in the Crito will be offered as an example of the
theory in practice. Finally, there will be discussion of
the importance of these societal obligations and discussion
about the limits of the inquiry concluded.
CONTENTS
Introduction
The Subject Matter of the Inquiry 1
Preliminary Jurisprudential Remark
Some Initial Suspicions and Response to Them
The 'Hobbist' Suspicion




The Concept of Obligation in Recent Moral Philosophy 11
Introduction
H.A. Prichard's Theory of Obligation
W.D. Ross: A Variation on a Theme
Frankena and a New Recommendation for the Bound
of Inquiry
Intuitionism and the Problem of Obligation
Criteria for an Adequate Theory of Obligation
Chapter II
Obligation and the Law of Contracts 36
Introduction
Section One 37
Implied Agreements: The Relevance of Conferred




Conclusion to Section One
VII
Section Two 46
Reliance as Consideration: The Relevance of
Dependency Relations of Parties to the
Imposition of Obligation





Conclusion to Section Two
Section Three 58
The Relevance of the Relative Bargaining Position
of Parties, a Kind of Difference of Status, to
the Imposition of Obligation
Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Insurance Company
Campbell Soup Company v. Wentz
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors
Conclusion to Section Three
Section Four 68
Summary: The Focus of the Law in the Determination
of Obligation
Section Five 70
Preliminary Reply to Prichard and Ross
Section Six 74
Conclusion to Chapter II
Chapter 111
The Meaning and Justification of Societal Obligation 76
Introduction
Some Problems in, and Requirements of, Social
Interaction
Why the Community Must Encourage the Making
and Keeping of Agreements
How the Community Encourages the Making and
Keeping of Agreements
Why the Community Must Discourage the Making
of Coercive Agreements
How the Community Discourages the Making of
Coercive Agreements
Obligation and the Community
How Can It Be Said That the Community Makes
This Argument
To Whom Is This Argument Offered
VIII
Obligation and Rationality
Societal Obligations as Moral Obligations
Societal Obligations and Legal Obligations
Response to Skepticism
Response to Prichard and Ross
Conclusion
Chapter IV
The Theory of Obligation Applied 104
Introduction
Obligation in the Crito
Other Applications of a Theory of Obligation
The Boundaries of Societal Obligation
Conclusion
Chapter V
Summary and Conclusion 124
A Unified Theory of Obligation--Summary and
Reflection
Obligation and Lawfulness
An Adequate Theory of Obligation
IX
Introduction
The Subject Matter of the Inquiry
This is an inquiry into the nature of legal and
moral obligation. An argument will be advanced for consider-
ing legal obligation as a model for moral obligation. Begin-
ning with an account of obligation in the law, particularly
the law of contracts, it will be argued that such an account
of obligation can be extended to reasoning about moral obli-
gation with fruitful result. But, the beginning with obligation
in the law does not reveal a commitment to the priority, either
logical or ontological, of legal obligation. This beginning
is merely a heuristic device aimed at laying out the facts
which are the roots of both legal and moral obligation.
There are certain facts about the way men in societies live
which, when recognized, provide the information from which
a rationale for obligation can emerge. Simply, there are
certain societal obligations which are at the root of both
legal and moral obligations.
The argument will begin by considering certain
1
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modern theories of obligation. We will examine the theories
of H.A. Prichard and W.D. Ross. These obligation theorists
belong to what is known as the intuitionist school. Their
approach to the problem of obligation is still followed by
many contemporary philosophers. At the end of chapter one
we will suggest that another perspective on the problem of
understanding obligations will provide more fruitful result
than that offered by Prichard and Ross and their contemporary
intellectual descendants. The presentation of this perspec-
tive will begin in chapter two, and will be concluded in
chapters three and four. In chapter five we shall consider
whether the alternative theory presented has provided more
enlightenment about obligation.
This paper will not discuss all types of obligation.
It will argue, primarily, that societal obligations are basic
to other types of obligation. That is, unless societal obli-
gations are acknowledged by men, conditions for the positing
and fulfillment of other types of obligation, such as, for
example, obligations to oneself, can never be realized. So-
cietal obligations are moral obligations, but there are moral
obligations which are not societal obligations but depend for
their existence upon a state of affairs in which societal
obligations are met. But there may be other sorts of obligations,
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such as obligations to God and obligations to oneself, and
if there are such obligations as these, this paper will say
nothing about them.
Preliminary Jurisprudential Remark
In the process of developing and pointing out
instances and principles of legal obligation, a theory about
the character and function of law will be revealed. This
theory of the nature and purpose of law will not be defended
from many attacks which would surely come from contemporary
schools of jurisprudence. The reader should be forewarned
that what is said about 'the law' is based upon a commitment
to law as a normative and purposive enterprise. This question,
the problem of 'the law as teacher', is itself a question for
another inquiry, and cannot here, in this context, be enter-
tained at any length.
Some Initial Suspicions and Response to Them
Suspicions, occasioned by the doubt that legal
obligation can be instructive for inquiry about moral obligation,
might initially take three forms. It is important that some-
thing be said about these suspicions immediately.
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The 'Hobbist' Suspicion
Despite some indebtedness to Hobbes, the arguments
of this paper do not reveal a commitment to a Hobbist conflation
of the moral into the legal by reference to both as 'enacted
rule' by an authoritative source which enactment both promul-
gates and justifies the This mistaken identification
of a) source and b) justification, seriously misrepresents
the process of legitimization of rules be they legal or moral.
To merely point to the fact of the power of the state in re-
sponse to a question about the legitimacy of legal institutions,
is to confuse a condition for successful operation of the law
with a question which is essentially about the rationality of
the law. Might is not identifiable with right in Socrates '
Greece or twentieth century international relations since power
is not self-justifying. To suggest that obligation is simply
explained by saying that it is what the state exacts from its
citizens by virtue of its power is to fail to see that an
obligation can be operative in the absence of such power, and
thus, that it draws its power, gains its status, from else-
where. Precisely, a world without enacted positive law need
not be characterized as a world without law, and further, it
ought to be noted, this need not draw us into espousing any
form of traditional natural law theory. We shall see the middle
ground of law, the justification by commitment and consent, as
our argument develops. The Code Books and the lex Dei are not
the only alternatives.
The Socio-Cultural Relativist Suspicion
It might be objected that the consideration of the
concepts of obligation contained in Anglo-American contract
law and their relevance to concepts of moral obligation is
such a narrow task, an inquiry so limited, that it isn't worth
the effort. Such an objection might insist that any concepts
of obligation developed thereby are only a summation of the
beliefs and opinions of certain individuals whose relative
perspectives limit their truths to particular places and
times; law, or morals, or both, assert truths only relative
to the cultures which adopt them and assert them in culturally
restrictive ways, and thus (it is concluded) these truths
have little import for the more broadly conceived human
community, except, of course, as sociological information.
But such an objection in principle cannot stand.
Differences of practice and belief, the favorite
evidence of this position, only attest to the fact that there
5
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are different practices and beliefs; it is not evidence that
a certain practice or belief need be, must be, or should be,
so limited. To show that legal or moral principles and rules,
general or specific, differ from society to society or culture
to culture, is not, ipso facto, support for the contention that
such principles or rules possess only relative validity. There
is such a thing as progress and enlightenment, and a society
can improve itself by following the deliverances of rational
judgment. Such judgment and its deliverance can achieve a
statement as humane as the Bill of Rights and when it does,
should not be placed on the same footing with the 1969 Con-
stitution of Rhodesia designed to perpetuate white minority
2
rule, merely by force of the relativist's insistence.
The Procedural-Relativist Suspicion
The third suspicion focuses upon the judicial decision
itself. It argues that to rely, as we will, upon the officially
expressed opinions of judges for the purpose of revealing the
courts ' focus in determining the obligations of one party to
another is unjustified. Denied in this reliance are the 'hard
facts' of the decision itself and the realities of all decision-
making processes. The discrepancy between expressed opinion
and the decision-making process is pointed to in order to
reveal the error of conceiving of the legal process as a rule-
bound activity. Through his writing, Jerome Frank revealed
why he is thought of as one of the leading advocates of
this suspicion.
The 'formalist', according to Frank, is deluded as
to the exclusive value of conventional legal rules and prin-
ciples. He must recognize that "the judge's opinion makes
it appear as if the decision were a result solely of playing
the game of law-in-discourse. What he does not see is that
"the opinions are often ex post facto; they are censored ex-
Specific decisions must be considered not as
the revelation of an unalterable course of logic proceeding
from unquestioned premises to undeniable conclusion but rather,
as Frank says, "as a result of the judge's hunches."^
To this suspicion there are many replies. First, as
a description of the legal decision itself, which is not the
focus of our inquiry, this alternative offered by Frank is not
completely convincing. Resting on the ’hunch' to explain an
obviously present uniformity in and predictability about,
decisions, is obviously troublesome. Secondly, as Frank
himself admits, the legal rules and principles are some of
£
what Frank calls the
nhunch producers." It is simply the
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case that a judge's intuition is likely to be informed by the
rules and principles about which he has been taught, whether
he recognizes that fact or not.
Looked at somewhat differently, this suspicion, in
demanding attention to the subjective facts of decision-making,
must recognize that if it is true that all reasons are ratio-
nalizations, then a distinction must nevertheless be made be-
tween 'good' or 'acceptable' rationalizations and 'bad' and
'unacceptable' ones. Practical affairs demand a distinction
between reasons or_ rationalizations which are acceptable and
those which are not. Despite the fact that all opinions
may have their origins in the 'hunches' of men, not all 'hun-
ches ' are equally acceptable for the purposes of knowing
and 'doing'.
Further, the rules and principles are taken se-
riously, as are the opinions, by those who recognize them
as, in Llewellyn's words, "rules of authoritative ought.
If it is an accepted convention to act and talk as_ if_ one
meant what he said in the promulgation of rules in an opinion,
then it is appropriate to evaluate what one has said as_
he meant it. When an opinion is offered as justification it
is appropriate to talk about it as justification whether or
not investigation reveals it to be mere 'window-dressing'
9
for the judge involved. Were our inquiry about the processes
involved in decision-making rather than about the value of
the reasons profferred in opinions of judges as justification
for the assignment of obligation, then the 'suspicion' would
form a large portion of our inquiry.
But for our purposes, for which we must evaluate the
justification given for decision by the courts, we have no
choice but to deal with that justification which is given.
If what Frank is aiming at is a question about the value of
all 'justificatory talk' we must refer him and the reader
who is suspicious to other philosophical works for a full
8
treatment of the subject. We are dealing with given expla-
nations, with a perspective on obligations which is offerred
by the opinions in the cases. We must take the judge at his
word; the burden rests upon him who says that the judge does
not mean what he says to prove it.
Final Introductory Remark
Apart from the major and corollary arguments and
the value which they possess, it is hoped that the reader will
gain some other value from this presentation. Hopefully, the
reader will gain some appreciation of the law as intellectual
10
business of the first order, whatever his opinion is at this
beginning point. Further, he should enjoy the wit and humor
of some of the more clever advocates of the law. Thirdly, I
hope that he is stimulated by the recognition of the variety
of agreements, bargains, and arrangements that men make with
each other to consider the degree to which he too is subject
to a wide variety of contracts. Finally, here is the evidence
of the varying fickleness, infidelity, pride, vanity, selfish-
ness, generosity, benevolence, dignity, and wisdom of men,
as such traits are revealed in the process of human dealings.
It is fortunate to able to write a paper about the obli-
gations of men to other men: the continuing subject matter
--human interaction and arrangement--thus provides an initial
asset of avoiding dullness.
Chapter One
The Concept of Obligation in Recent
Moral Philosophy
Introduction
We now begin this inquiry into the problem of
obligation. The problem of obligation is posed by the fol-
lowing question: What satisfactory reply can be given to
the skeptic who questions whether there are obligations? The
skeptic may object a) to the general claim that there are
obligations or b) to particular claims that there is an ob-
ligation in certain circumstances. In response to this
skepticism we shall argue that there are obligations and
shall advance and support particular claims about obligations
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how
prominent moral philosophers in this century have responded
to the problem of obligation. We shall look at the philo-
sophies of H.A. Prichard and W.D. Ross. Following this,
we shall take a brief look at a contemporary debate about
11
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obligation engaged in by intellectual descendants of Prichard
and Ross. At this point, we shall pause and reflect about the
perspective from which Prichard and Ross and their intellec-
tual descendants view the problem of obligation. With the
help of another contemporary philosopher we shall then note
our dissatisfactions with the choice of this perspective.
Finally, we shall suggest that another perspective be taken
on the problem, and shall put forward criteria for evaluating
our alternative theory.
H.A. Prichard 1 s Theory of Obligation
H.A. Prichard in his famous essay, Moral Obligation,
1
immediately sets important limits to his contribution. He
recognizes, he says, what he believes his audience believes,
that he as a philosopher is speaking and writing as if (it
would be assumed) there were something to be said about moral
obligation. But to this stereotype Prichard admits embarras-
ment. He wonders aloud about his task. This wonder is sug-
gestive of the tone and import of the entire essay. He writes:
To many it will come as a surprise that there are questions
to be raised about moral obligation. For although a nor-
mal person, once he has reached a certain age, plainly
has the idea of moral obligation, since he thinks of him-
self as morally bound not to do certain actions, and
although he will have asked himself on various occasions
13
whether he ought or ought not to do certain actions, he
is not therefore necessarily led to ask any general question
about moral obligation, such as: What character must an
act have for us to be morally bound to do it? Yet, the
existence of such questions is shown by the existence of
what are called books on moral philosophy, in whose subject
duty undeniably occupies an important if not the central
place.^
Skepticism about traditional moral philosophies is in part a
function of Prichard's conclusion about the nature of moral
obligation itself, for (seemingly) when one knows what it is
about which one speaks then to speak of it as something else
is a mistake.
Thus, Prichard wants to know what kind of thing is
referred to by the phrase 'moral obligation'. He answers
that the thing referred to is something which is "sui generis
i.e., unique and therefore incapable of having its nature
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expressed in terms of the nature of anything else." Prichard
does not speak of moral obligation but about what he calls
a 'sense' of rightness or obligatoriness for this is how the
attribute referred is understood. He says about this sense
of obligation t_o d_o some act that it is "absolutely underiva-
tive or immediate."^
If the obligation is to be investigated through the
’sense of obligation' and if this sense possesses the charac-
ter Prichard attributes to it, then certain conclusions follow
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about the utility of certain kinds of discourse concerning
investigation into obligation. These conclusions are contained
in what Prichard calls the negative side of his theory. He
writes:
The negative side of all this is, of course that we do
not come to appreciate an obligation by an argument, i.e.,
by a process of non-moral thinking, and that in particular
we do not do so by an argument of which a premise is the
ethical but not moral activity of appreciating the good-
ness either of the act or of a consequence of the act;
i.e., that our sense of the rightness of an act is not a
conclusion from our appreciation of the goodness either
of it or of anything else.s
To argue, as Prichard does, that appreciation of an
obligation is not achieved by argument is to set limits to
the usefulness of argument in the task of trying to appreciate
the presence of an obligation in a particular situation. This
point requires emphasis, for Prichard does not argue that ar-
gument has no use but that its use is limited, i.e., it is
to be cut off, stopped at some point, and intuition is to
provide final access to that which one seeks. Certain rea-
sonings might play preliminary roles in gaining appreciation.
Prichard writes:
To appreciate its [action's] rightness two preliminaries
may be necessary. We may have to follow out the conse-
quences of the proposed action more fully than we have
hitherto done, in order to realize that in the action
we should originate A (one whole set of consequences]
. . . Again we may have to take into account the relation
B involved in the situation, which we had hitherto
15
failed to notice.
But once these relations are perceived, once, as Prichard
puts it, "we come to recognize that the proposed act is one
by which we shall originate A in a relation B," then our
preliminary reasoning is completed and our mode of appreciation
changes, as Prichard states, "we then appreciate the obligation
immediately or directly. Argument is preliminary to appre-
ciation and it may be necessary, but, it is never a sufficient
condition of discovery. Argument seems to have the role of
removing certain impediments from one's vision, which once
removed enables one to see directly, clearly, immediately.
Prichard announces that there is a point at which argument
leaves off for intuition to enter. We must note that Pri-
chard does not tell us where this point is; he only tells
us that there is such a point.
Prichard admits to the subjectivist notion of
obligation, that is, that the existence of an obligation de-
pends upon some subjective apprehension of obligation, upon
some feeling or sense of obligation. He writes:
Yet since, in fact, it (obligation] is a character of
ourselves, there is nothing to prevent its existence
depending on our having certain thoughts about the
situation, about the nature of the activity in respect
of its effects. Indeed for this reason, its existence
must depend on some fact about ourselves ...We
16
cannot therefore but that the subjective view
is true.
If one believes that some sort of subjective awareness is
the ratio essendi of obligation then it must be clear that
argument and discussion with others comes to serve a peculiar
purpose when it is appreciation of obligation that is sought
through such activity. Argument and discussion must lead to
subjective appreciation; they must function through such
appreciation to be relevant to the task of discovering ob-
ligation. They cannot, by themselves, apart from such ap-
prehension, determine that an obligation is present.
Prichard believes that his theory of obligation
requires him to attack critically the traditional exponents
of the notion that there is much of importance to be done
by the moral philosopher in the task of helping others to
come to an appreciation of (their) obligation(s). Prichard
in one place insists that the entire subject of moral phi-
-9
losophy has been an "attempt to answer an improper question."
But once this mistaken attempt is pointed out, it is possible,
according to Prichard, to have a new kind of moral philo-
sophy considerably more humble in its aspiration. It must
be a kind of moral philosophy grounded in the recognition
of how obligations come to be. The demand for knowledge
17
about things like obligations must be answered with reference
to such recognition. Prichard writes:
Nevertheless, the demand, though illegitimate, is inev-
itable until we have carried the process of reflection
far enough to realize the self-evidence of our obligations,
i.e., the immediacy of our apprehension of them. This
realization of their self-evidence is positive knowledge,
and so far, and so far only, as the term moral philosophy
is confined to this knowledge and to the knowledge of
the parallel immediacy of the apprehension of the good-
ness of the various virtues and of good
generally is there such a thing as moral philosophy.
We shall take issue with the limitation thus imposed in the
body of this paper.
Before a brief summary of Prichard's view is pro-
vided a short look at his conclusions in an article entitled
The Obligation to Keep a Promise will be worthwhile. There,
Prichard talks about promises and how the use of the word
'promise' or some equivalent word usually implies in common
usage that the promisor is under obligation to the promisee.
There is, Prichard says, a practice of associating the use
of the word 'promise' with the presence of an obligation for
him who uses it, and there is a kind of unwritten agreement
that one will not use these words unless he means to accept
and recognize the obligation. But Prichard is troubled about
the status of this unwritten agreement. He writes:
The general conclusion which I wish to suggest, but only
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with the greatest hesitation, is that promising to do
this or that action, in the ordinary sense of promising,
can only exist among individuals between whom there has
already been something which looks at first like an agree-
ment to keep agreements, but is really an agreement not
to use certain noises except in a certain way, the agree-
ment nevertheless being one which, unlike ordinary agree-
ments, does not require the use of language. But, of
course, it would be more accurate to say that what I am
suggesting is not a conclusion but rather a problem for
consideration; viz. what is that something implied in
the existence of agreements which looks very much like
an agreement and yet, strictly speaking, cannot be an
agreement .-*■■*-
Prichard here touches on a very important phenomenon of human
association. The agreement which is not, strictly speaking,
an agreement, will reappear and will function critically in
the theory of obligation put forward by this author. Prichard's
penchant for the 'ordinary' and 'normal' way of viewing things
limits his capacity to transcend the perspective offered by
that vision of things and inform it, enlarge it, by the view
offered from other perspectives.
Beginning our summing up of Prichard's view with
this last issue, it appears that Prichard made inquiry about
obligation turn, in large part, on the delineation and ex-
planation of the experience, reported by 'normal' men, of
feeling obligated. Thus, part of the problem is stripped
away by Prichard's announcement of what it is that he will
talk about and what it is he will avoid. Prichard makes
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inquiry about obligation inquiry about the sense of obligation.
An obligation depends for its existence, in Prichard's view,
on one feeling that he is obligated. This is to say that the
problem of obligation, the problem to be investigated, is to
be responded to in a particular way. For Prichard, the skeptic
should be pointed to the fact that individuals apprehend,
recognize, appreciate, obligations.
Prichard argues that the sense or feeling of being
obligated is absolutely underivative and immediate. His form
of intuitionism can be characterized as intuition at the level
of the particular act. It is in this context that intuition
is required and obligation revealed. Argument and discussion
are not ruled out, are not kept out, of this context. They
serve the useful purpose of bringing one to the point in a
context at which intuition takes over. Discussion and ar-
gument take one to the point at which he is able to see what
it is that he wants to see, but the seeing, the appreciation,
is credited to something other than these. For they are not
by themselves sufficient, for as Prichard says, "we do not
12
come to appreciate an obligation by an argument."
We mentioned earlier that it is difficult to locate
the point at which, according to Prichard's theory, discussion
and argument are closed off for intuition. Prichard does
20
not mark the point; he does not provide road signs announcing
to argument and discussion 'This far and no further'. It is
only clear that discussion and argument cannot go the whole
distance. Gradually, it seems, impediments and obstacles to
vision-recognition of one's obligation--are removed until one
is able to see what he should see. The 'obligation' is to
be revealed at some point; at what point is never made clear.
W.D. Ross: A Variation of the Theme
In The Right and the Good, Ross is concerned to
discover whether "there is any general character which makes
right acts right, and if so, what it is."
J
Though Ross does
not intend to deal directly with obligation, his answer to
this question has important implications for the understand-
ing of obligation.
In his essay The Meaning of Right, Ross concludes
that the attempt to formulate criteria for rightness has al-
ways been unsatisfactory. This ought to lead the ethicist,
in Ross's opinion, to a basic assumption about fundamental
terms in the vocabulary of morals:
Anyone who is satisfied that neither the subjective
theories of the meaning of "right" nor what is far the
most attractive of the attempts to reduce it to simpler
21
objective elements ... is correct, will probably be
prepared to agree that "right" is an irreducible notion.
Ross's support for his argument rests in an appeal to common
usage which shows that 'right' is not equivalent in meaning
either to what the subjectivists or objectivists put forward
for it. Thus, in response to the question about the general
character of right acts asked above, Ross responds that there
is no such general character; 'right' is an irreducible notion
But for Ross the irreducibility of 'right' does not
lead one to skeptical conclusions regarding the business of
moral philosophers. Ross argues that there is much to be
done by the philosopher. He himself goes on to discuss the
recognition by men of the existence of certain duties. Some
of these duties are what Ross calls "prima facie duties."
It is the business, the legitimate business, of the philo-
sopher to investigate the nature of these duties.
Prima facie duties are accepted by men as things
they are obliged to do. These include duties which rest
a) on one's own previous acts, b) on acts of others to or
for one, c) on "the fact or possibility of a distribution of
pleasure or happiness," and on other But these
obligations possess a character which Ross is concerned to
stress emphatically. He writes:
That an act, qua fulfilling a promise, or qua effecting
a just distribution of good ... is prima facie right,
is self-evident, not in the sense that it is evident
from the beginning of our lives, or as soon as we attend
to the proposition for the first time, but in the sense
that when we have reached sufficient mental maturity
and have given sufficient attention to the proposition
it is evident without any need of proof, or of evidence
beyond itself. It is self-evident just as a mathematical
axiom, or the validity of a form of inference, is evident.
Prichard characterized an obligation as something which is
known through intuition; here, Ross characterizes the grasping
of certain kinds of duties as being self-evident; he is an
intuitionist at the level of the type or kind of act. One
'knows' these duties and in affirming them has a tool whereby
the determination of the presence or absence of obligation in
a particular situation may be facilitated.
But, the duties revealed to the mentally mature and
attentive do not help, in Ross’s opinion, as much as one might
hope in the task of determining what one's obligation is in
a particular situation. Situations are complex. Judgments
about duty in such specific situations do not possess ’’the
certainty that attaches to our recognition of the general
18
principles of duty.” These duties, self-evident to the
mentally mature and attentive, disclose in general what one
is to do, but in particular, in the context of a particular
situation, their application is troublesome. Situations
22
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reveal conflicts between duties. One seeks a way out of the
conflict; one seeks resolution. Ross attempts to offer a
procedure for resolution of conflict when it occurs, and in
so doing, he offers additional criteria for determining
'what makes acts right'. He says:
It is worthwhile to try to state more definitely the
nature of the acts that are right. We may try to state
first what (if anything) is the universal nature of all
acts that are right . . . Every act viewed in some as-
pects will be prima facie right, and viewed in others
prima facie wrong, and right acts can be distinguished
from wrong acts only as being those which, of all those
possible for the agent in the circumstances, have the
greatest balance of prima facie rightness, in those
respects in which they are prima facie right, over their
prima facie wrongness, in those respects in which they are
prima facie wrong.l9
But, a problem arises. Something is needed to measure amounts
of prima facie rightness and prima facie wrongness. Given
a conflict between two prima facie duties, how is one to
determine which, if followed, gives rise to the greatest
amount of prima facie rightness 'over' prima facie wrongness?
Something is needed which provides for priorities of duty,
which sets forth some criteria enabling the calculation to
take place. Ross admits the problem but indicates that he
is pessimistic about a solution:
For the estimation of the comparative stringency of
these prima facie obligations no general rules can,
so far as I can see, be laid down. We can only say that
a great deal of stringency belongs to the duties of
'perfect obligation'--the duties of keeping our promises,
of repairing wrongs we have done, and of returning the
equivalent of services we have received. 2o
This is the limit of rules. Practical judgment can, it appears,
go no further in formulating principles or rules relevant to
duties and obligations. It is now left to the care of the
mentally mature and attentive.
For Ross, the problem of obligation is a two part
problem. First, one needs to discover and announce to the
skeptic the general principles of obligation, the general
rules of duty, what Ross calls the 'prima facie duties'.
Secondly, one must recognize that these principles are self-
evident and that it is with them that recognition of obligation
begins. Once grasped, these duties can be brought to parti-
cular situations to aid in the determination of one's obli-
gation in that situation. Intuition provides access to prin-
ciples which will help, with the limits Ross recognizes, in
the particular situation where ignorance or conflict and
confusion prevail.
Some differences between Prichard and Ross, crucial
to evaluation of their theories, must be marked out. First,
Ross is less concerned than Prichard to mark out the borders
of moral inquiry by fiat; and thus will not join Prichard in
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the latter's attack upon the fruitfulness of the inquiry into
right, duty, and obligation. Ross, though limiting himself
and perhaps other moral philosophers by his conception of what
things discussion may fruitfully inform, is nevertheless ba-
sically enthusiastic about trying to provide rules and prin-
ciples for the determination of duty and obligation. He does
not question his motives nor insist nor suggest that the
profession of some expertise in these matters must finally
prove embarrasing to the philosopher.
This general characterization of Ross's penchant
for doing moral philosophy is reflected in his theory. Here,
there is simply a great deal more to be said about the charac-
ter of moral obligation than Prichard was willing to say.
Ross does not subscribe to the notion that cases of obligation,
i.e., situations in which obligations are to be recognized,
offer or reveal their 'obligation content', following pre-
liminary discussion, by intuition. This disagreement with
Prichard is explained by noting the different place and pur-
pose of intuition in the Rossian account. As was mentioned
earlier, if Prichard can be characterized as intuitionist
at the level of the particular act, Ross is intuitionist at
the level of the type or kind of act. Thus, Ross's prima
facie duties are self-evident and apply to all contexts in
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which the question of one's duty or obligation arises. One
brings the results of one's 'grasping' or 'appreciating' to
particular situations. Thus, when the self-evidence of one's
obligation in the particular situation is not revealed within
the situation itself, conflict can arise, and conflict can
lead to uncertainty, to ignorance about what it is one ought
to do. This possibility, not treated by Prichard, Ross
admits and emphatically demonstrates.
Thirdly, Ross leaves the inquiry open in a way that
Prichard does not. Admitting the limitations of his recommended
procedure for estimating the relative stringency of duties,
Ross does not rule out the possibility of finding other more
suitable criteria. The inquiry is left open for suggestions
about the hierarchy of prima facie duties; perhaps more de-
finitive rules relevant to the application of these duties
to situations can be supplied. These are problems about
duty and obligation which Ross urges the philosopher to consider
Fourthly, Ross, because of his persuasive discussion
about prima facie duties, better represents the kind of jus-
tification usually offered in commonplace discourse about
moral obligation. It is familiar to hear justification for
assertion or denial of obligation resting upon invocation of
the duties Ross enumerates. Men talk about obligation in the
way Ross does; they talk about these duties Ross enumerates,
and like Ross they find difficulty in the thought of going
beyond them. That is, men take these duties to be self-evident;
reference to them is the court of last appeal.
The final contrast, again with reference to the
prima facie duties, is Ross's clear delineation of the point
at which discussion ends and intuition enters. Discussion ends
at the point where one recognizes one's prima facie duties.
Ross better marks the road. We may have room to argue about,
for example, the relative stringency of these duties, but the
duties themselves are not to be denied as such. We do not
deny them when we have grasped them, and for the task of grasp-
ing them, understanding them, Ross announces clearly where
the road turns.
Frankena and a New Recommendation for the Bound of Inquiry
William Frankena's article, Obligation and Moti-
vation in Recent Moral Philosophy, considers the arguments
of some intellectual descendants of Prichard and Ross, phi-
losophers reared and nurtured in the tradition we have been
considering. This contemporary debate over the nature of
obligation Frankena characterizes as the debate between
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'externalists' and 'internalists'. Their dispute as recorded
by Frankena is as follows:
Many moral philosophers have said or implied that it is
in some sense logically possible for an agent to have or
see that he has an obligation even if he has no motivation,
actual or dispositional, for doing the action in question;
many others have said or implied that this is paradoxical
and not logically possible.
It may be that Prichard would have to be considered an inter-
nalist and Ross an externalist by this standard, but this is
not the issue which concerns us. What is more interesting
and important is Frankena's conclusion about the merits of
each of the positions. It reveals his concern to view each
argument in light of some of the basic and fundamental issues
of morals and moral philosophy. Frankena writes:
It seems to me, therefore, that in the end the inter-
nalist must argue (as Falk does), not only that externalism
involves a gap between obligation and motivation but that
such a gap cannot be tolerated, given morality's task of
guiding human conduct autonomously. Then, however, the
externalist will counter by pointing out that internalism
also entails a danger to morality. Externalism, he will
say, in seeking to keep the obligation to act in certain
ways independent of the vagaries of individual motivation,
runs the risk that motivation may not always be present,
let alone adequate, but internalism in insisting on build-
ing in motivation, runs the corresponding risk of having
to trim obligation to the size of individual motives.
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Thus, Frankena argues that the merits of the disputants'
claims must be evaluated in light of the more broadly con-
ceived problem of morality's subject matter, aims, and ends.
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To consider the evaluation of such theories to turn
on larger questions, Frankena is committed to a criticism of
the disputants' procedure. He makes this criticism willingly
The main result yielded by our discussion, then, is that
the opposition we are studying cannot be resolved, as
so many seem to think, by such relatively small scale
logical or semi-logical arguments as we have been dealing
with. 23
It can be resolved, according to Frankena, by other broader
scoped inquiries, inquiries into the "relation of morality
to society, and of society to the individual.ln the con-
clusion to his essay Frankena gives a final exhortation to a
broadening of the inquiry into obligation; he provides a re-
commendation of the subject matter with which an inquiry into
obligation must deal if it is to satisfactorily answer the
important problem posed by 'externalisin' and
l internalism'.
He writes:
The battle, if war there be, cannot be contained; its
field is the whole human world, and a grand strategy with
a total commitment of forces is demanded of each of its
participants. What else could a philosopher expect
Conversant with the language of Moore, Prichard, Ross, and
their descendants in the tradition, Frankena demands that
he and other philosophers be not limited by the perspective
offered by that tradition. This demand for a new perspective
on the problem of obligation brings us to the stage of critical
reflection about what it is that we have been dealing with,
and such reflection will be followed by specific criticism of
the theories of Prichard and Ross and finally, the setting
forth of a new theory from a broader perspective.
Intuitionism and the Problem of Obligation
We have seen that for Prichard the problem of obli-
gation is best met by speaking of obligations as things felt
or sensed by individuals. Obligations are facts about oneself,
as Prichard says. To Ross, the problem of obligation is
answered by reference to recognition of prima facie duties
and to the need for applying the fruits of such recognition
to particular situations. For both philosophers, intuition
plays some important role in revealing obligations. It may
be the case that at some point in any theory of obligation
some sort of appeal to intuition is necessary. It may be
the case that to 'grasp the simple', to see what must be
seen, is finally the task of all inquiry. That is, all dis-
cussion and argument may lead, and it is their purpose to
lead, to some point at which one can argue and discuss no more
but must simply see, grasp, appreciate. If this is so, what
may differentiate theories of obligation is where and how
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well one marks the point where discussion ceases and intuition
takes over.
With Prichard and Ross the problem of obligation is
understood and answered too narrowly. As Frankena recommends,
the perspective must be broadened. It is my opinion that the
narrowness of perspective of the views of Prichard and Ross
is related to their premature introduction of intuition. In-
tuition may be required at some point in order to understand,
appreciate, one's obligation, but I believe it ought to be
brought in at a point other than that indicated or marked
by Prichard and Ross. Because of the narrowness of perspective
of the views of Prichard and Ross I believe they are subject
to the following criticisms.
First, there is a failure to establish satisfactory
criteria for resolving situations of conflict and ignorance.
That is, where the individual believes he is caught between
conflicting obligations or where he is ignorant of whether
or not he has an obligation, Prichard and Ross do not provide
adequate criteria for resolution of the problem. This pro-
blem of conflict is obvious in regard to Prichard's theory
as we have shown earlier. With Ross, the possibility of
conflict is recognized and admitted but Ross himself admits
the limitations of his own theory in helping to resolve the
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conflict due to the absence of any rules relevant to defining
the 'comparative stringency of duties'.
The situation in which there is ignorance of whether
or not one has an obligation is similar to the situation of
conflict for pointing out shortcomings in the theories. Again,
by the way Prichard understands the problem of obligation
the fact of being ignorant of one's obligation amounts to
the absence of feeling obligated, and unless the failure rests
in neglect of what Prichard calls preliminary argument and
discussion, there is no way out of one's ignorance. There
are no road signs to follow. With Ross, the inapplicability
of any of the prima facie duties to a particular situation
leaves the situation, and the individual within it, in a
similar state. In short, we want to know, given a particular
situation in which either conflict or ignorance prevails,
whether more can be provided by way of investigation for the
purpose of determining obligation, than is provided by
Prichard and Ross. Are there other road signs?
Second, there is a failure to establish sufficient
criteria for the point or place at which discussion and argument
are to be cut off, and the 1 grasp
1
or intuition to take place.
Both Prichard and Ross are trying to point out that the in-
dividual must, at some point, see, intuit, or grasp, some
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'simple' or some unanalyzable or underivative character in the
general task of discovering one's obligation(s). For Prichard
it is not argued where one does close off discussion for this
intuition. For Ross, the point is marked off clearly, but is
marked off prematurely. Too soon do both philosophers invoke
the need for intuition. It is possible to be both precise
about where this cut-off point lies and yet to extend it, and
thus extend the fruitfulness of discussion and argument be-
yond a point marked by Ross.
Third, by_ concentrating on the subjective appre-
hension of obligation, a dimension of obligation equally rele-
vant to understanding what it is men call their obligations,
is lost. One need not meet what we have called the problem
of obligation by reference to the individual apprehension of
obligation in the way Prichard and Ross talk about it, either
in the feeling of obligation (Prichard) or the apprehension
of prima facie duties (Ross). It is possible to talk about
obligations, to thus deal with the problem of obligation from
another perspective, namely, from that of the individual mem-
ber of society as member of society. We can talk about obli-
gation as something which arises because men would live together
Such a perspective as that just suggested will be
offered in the four chapters. It will broaden the boundaries
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of the inquiry in a way recommended by Frankena. When we
are finished we shall have to decide whether this theory too
necessitates some recourse to what we have called intuition.
If it does, we shall then have to decide how and where this
intuition functions differently in our theory than it does
in the theories of Prichard and Ross. Finally, we shall have
to decide whether this other perspective, provides any more
fruitful results for answering the skeptic than the theories
we have been considering. We shall argue that it does pro-
vide such results.
Criteria for an Adequate Theory of Obligation
Taking the perspective wa have chosen we shall
attempt to answer the following questions. These questions
arise from the skepticism which, as we stated at the beginning
of the chapter, creates the problem of obligation.
1. What do we mean when we say that an individual, A,
is obligated to another individual, B?
2. Is it true to say that in particular situations, A
is obligated to B?
3. In those situations how do we decide whether Ais
obligated to B?
In addition to answering these questions we shall
answer a fourth question:
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4. When we have described the situation as one about which
it is true to say that A has an obligation to B, does
this fact exhaust description of the meaningful rela-
tionships which exist between A and B?
We shall now begin to answer these questions by
turning our attention to examples of legal obligation.
Chapter Two
Obligation and the Law of Contracts *
Introduction
Courts reveal a predilection for considering certain
kinds of factors and elements within situations as most rele-
vant in answering the question of whether an obligation is
present in such situations. The kinds of things which the
law looks at are the kinds of things, we shall argue, that
the moralist or_ moral man ought to look at in defending
obligation claims and in pursuit of an understanding of
obligation.
We will consider some rather commonplace issues
in the law of contracts revealed in the context of actual
cases in Anglo-American law. The fact that these cases are
commonplace in no way takes away from, but rather supports,





Implied Agreements: The Relevance of Conferred Benefits to
The Imposition of Obligation
In Re Crisan^-
Mrs. Sona Crisan was an eighty-seven year old widow
While shopping at her grocer's on Saint Patrick's Day, 1955,
she suddenly collapsed. Police were summoned and she was
taken to the emergency ward of a Detroit hospital where she
remained, unconscious, for fourteen days. Later, she was
transferred to another city hospital where she remained until
she died, eleven months later. During all this time, Mrs.
Crisan never regained consciousness. She, therefore, was
never aware of the services that were being given to her;
she obviously had never explicitly agreed to acceptance of
them; nor had she ever signed any agreement nor acknowledged
any dealings with the hospital. When she died she left a
fairly large estate. To this estate the city of Detroit
attached a claim for three thousand dollars, the amount
expended in her care. The executor of her estate refused
to make payment. The city of Detroit then brought suit
against the estate for the above amount. The case finally
found its way to the Supreme Court of Michigan where Justice
Edwards spoke, in decision, for the majority.
Edwards agreed with the contention of the appellant
executor that Mrs. Crisan had obviously never agreed expli-
citly to any obligations to the city. That was an unchallenged
issue of fact. But Edwards and a majority of the court felt
that an implied agreement existed, that the dealings between
Sosa Crisan and the city of Detroit constituted an enforceable
contract. To find for the city seemed to Edwards so obvious
a conclusion that it barely required comment:
And the reasons upon which this decision rests are too
broad, as well as too sensible and too humane to be
overborne by any deductions which a refined logic may
make from the circumstances that in such cases there
can be no contract or promise in fact. 2
To Edwards the violation of the usual pattern of contractual
dealing--the explicit agreement, the drawing up upon a sheet
of paper the mutual obligations accepted, the carrying out
of performance of these obligations by the parties--was not
sufficient reason to vitiate the contractual status of what
had taken place, the result of which was a judgment for the
city.
But Edwards had more to appeal to than 'humaneness'
and 'sensibility'; he had, for one, the Restatement of the
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Law of Contracts, a document prepared by the American Law
Institute. 3 In this document was a provision which Edwards
relied on, and in this provision we find an argument of interest
A person who has supplied things or services to another,
although acting without the other's knowledge or consent,
is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if,
a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge
therefor, and
b) the things or services were necessary to prevent
the other from suffering serious bodily harm or
pain, and
c) the person supplying them had no reason to know
that the other would not consent to receiving them
if mentally competent; and
d) it was impossible for the other to give consent or
because of extreme youth or mental impairment, the
other's consent would have been immaterial.^
Edwards and the majority accept the ALI opinion that what
is of the greatest relevance here in determining whether
Crisan has an obligation to the city is discovered by finding
out about a) the nature and effect of the benefits and b) the
'minds’ and intentions of the parties. What can be inferred
from the situation of the parties about their states of mind,
and whether or not the benefits were of effect, i.e., were
real benefits, seem to be the decisive issues. Our next
two cases will further refine what the import of these
considerations is.
Day v. Cat on-^
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Caton and Day lived on adjoining lots. There appeared
to be some need for a party wall between these lots. Caton,
without consulting Day, began construction upon the land
bordering their lots of such a party wall. There had been
no agreement between Caton and Day about the possibility of
such construction nor had there been any agreement to share
expenses were such construction ever undertaken. When Caton
finished building the wall, he presented to Day a bill for
one half the cost of the work. Day refused to pay, insisting
that he had never agreed to such payment, nor had he ever
in conversation intimated to Caton that he might, at some
point in time so agree. In court, Day insisted that his
standing by and watching in silence could not "raise (any]
£
implied promise to pay anything for the wall." Caton, of
course, insisted that such conduct constituted an implied
promise. The lower court accepted Caton's argument, but
the issue was phrased somewhat differently in the judge's
instruction to the jury:
A promise would not be implied from the fact that the
plaintiff {Caton] , with the defendant's knowledge, built
the wall and the defendant used it, but it might be im-
plied from the conduct of the parties. If the jury
find that the plaintiff undertook and completed the
building of the wall with the expectation that the
defendant would pay him for it, and the defendant
had reason to know that the plaintiff was so acting
with that expectation, and allowed him to so act
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without objection, then the jury might infer a promise
on the part of the defendant to pay the plaintiff.^
On appeal, the questioned instruction was held to be proper
and a correct statement of the law. Judge Devens, speaking
for a majority of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, wrote
that in some situations, "silence may be interpreted as
assent," especially if one is silent "in the face of facts
o
which fairly call upon him to speak." Devens pointed to
the facts of a) the reception of a benefit by Day, b) Day's
option to refuse which was not exercised, and c) Day's
silence, as the decisive facts. Again, as in Crisan, it
appears that the states of mind of parties and the presence




Burge published a paper in Butler, Missouri. The
father-in-law of Austin subscribed to the paper and requested
Burge to send it to Austin for a period of two years. For
that period the father-in-law paid but when the subscription
ran out Burge continued to send the paper to Austin and
billed him. This went on for several years. During that
time Austin sent payment of the subscription price twice
but on each occasion requested Burge to cancel his subscription
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for the future. Burge didn't stop sending the paper and
Austin continued to read it but refused to pay for it. Burge
brought suit against Austin for the subscription price of
the paper for the years unpaid.
At the trial on the lower level Austin won the
case, convincing the judge and jury that to enforce payment
would be, in effect, to force him into contractual relations
he never wished to have, and such a forcing could not be
grounds for a valid agreement. It was the evidence of his
demand that the paper be no longer delivered which apparently
distinguished his case, in the eyes of the lower court, from
Caton v. Day. Burge, however, appealed to the Kansas City
Court of Appeals and the judgment of the lower court was
reversed. The majority, speaking through Judge Ellison,
reasoned its finding for Burge.
Ellison agreed with Austin that "one cannot be
forced into contractual relations with another and that
therefore he cannot against his will be made debtor of the
newspaper publisher. But, Ellison insisted, "it is
equally certain that he [Austin] may cause contractual
relations to arise by necessary implications from his
conduct. Such necessary implications were present
here according to Ellison. The conduct referred to, of
course, was Austin's continuing acceptance of the paper
and the receiving of benefits thereby. In Ellison's view
this case had many of the same elements as Caton v. Day
despite Austin's protest to the contrary. Ellison writes:
One who accepts the paper by continuously taking it
from the post office, receives a benefit and pleasure
arising from such labor and expenditure as fully as if
he had appropriated any other product of another's labor.^3
Further, Ellison continues, "there being no pretense that a
gratuity was intended, an obligation arose to pay for it."-^
Ellison, like the judges in the other two cases,
focuses on the questions of benefit and the 'intentions' of
the parties as manifested by their acts for the purpose of
coming to a decision about whether Austin has an obligation
to Burge. It is now appropriate to consider what signifi-
cance these cases, and what brief remarks we have made about
them, have for our inquiry. This statement of significance
must be understood as only an initial statement. The sig-
nificance of these cases is really cumulative and only after
we have presented all the cases will we be able to give a
full explanation of what it is that these cases provide for
our argument.
Conclusion to Section One
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In general, these cases on 'benefits conferred'
indicate the importance of a) the reception of benefits by
one party because of the action of another party, and b) the
intentions of the parties as manifested in their conduct, as
criteria for the imposition of obligation by a court of law.
What is considered a benefit by the law is fairly obvious;
it is not different from any common sense notion of what
constitutes a benefit. The only test, it appears, of whether
a service or an action performed for another is a benefit is
whether the party so receiving considers the service beneficial,
or would consider it beneficial judged by some reference to
commonly accepted notions of what individuals value. We ask
whether the party considered such service a benefit or whether
it can be presumed that he would consider it a benefit as we
consider whether the standard practice would be to consider
such service a benefit. The notion of what constitutes the
intentions of the parties, both the provider and the receiver,
is, in the law, a more complex notion and something must be
said about it.
To preserve the dictum that one cannot be forced
into contractual relations with another it is necessary to
alter the commonly accepted notion of 'intent' in order to
account for the 'willingness' of the parties in the cases
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where willingness is not evident to initial inspection. It
is obvious, first of all, that the determination of whether
the parties finally burdened with obligation in these cases
should be so burdened is not disclosed by reference to their
privately held wishes. Crisan had no such wishes or intentions;
Day had no intentions of entering into contractual dealings
and Austin indicated a definite intention to end or cease
contractual relations. Some concept of 'intention' or 'wil-
lingness
'
must be located beyond such privately held wishes
to justify the argument that these parties were not forced
into contractual relations.
In all three cases the determination of the 'wil-
lingness ' of the parties is supplied by an inference from
their conduct or status. In the cases of Crisan and Day
there was silence; in the case of Austin there were words
to an effect contrary to 'willingness'; but in all three
cases there was the reception and enjoyment of non-gratu-
itously given benefits. It is to such reception and enjoy-
ment that the court refers in its justification of imposing
obligations upon the parties. Thus, the presence of non-
gratuitously given benefits enjoyed by the receiving party
is the key to understanding the assignment of an implied
promise in these cases by the court. We can refer again
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to Ellison's argument. First indicating the presence of an
enjoyed benefit for Day, Ellison concludes, "there being no
pretence that a gratuity was intended, an obligation arose
to pay for it."^
It is important to note that these cases reveal an
avowed determination of the part of the law to get to the
consideration of the ultimate benefits which are effected by
means of the interaction of the parties beyond any simple
reference to signed and sealed agreements, documents, letters
and the like. Any notion that such formal requirements deter
mine the absence or presence of obligation for parties under
the law of contracts must be dismissed. In Crisan and Day
there were no such documents, and in Austin the only document
was a letter by Austin indicating his strong wish that the
subscription be stopped. It is obvious that the significance
of such written instruments pales beside the result of the
inquiry into the results of interaction of the parties, how
the parties were changed, how the parties were benefited,
how their specific concrete situations were altered.
Section Two
Reliance as Consideration: The Relevance of Dependency
Relations of Parties to the Imposition of Obligation
Introductory Note on Consideration in the Law of Contracts
In determining that each of the situations in section
one were contract situations with legally enforceable obli-
gations, it was settled that each party was receiving, or was
to receive, because of the 'agreement', a certain benefit. The
benefits received by Crisan, Day, and Austin, were benefits of
different sorts, while the benefit sought by Detroit, Caton,
and Burge was in each case money. These benefits altogether
form the 'consideration' of the contracts, the 'that for which'
an agreement is entered. In the law of contracts agreements
to be legally enforceable must possess 'consideration' on
both sides; each side must profit or gain because of the agree-
ment. A party cannot make an agreement with another that
this other work for him for the remainder of his life for the
wage of one peppercorn and then seek enforcement in a court
of law. The reciprocal activities are so incommensurate that
the law would have to judge there was insufficient consideration,
no consideration at all on one side, and hence no valid
agreement. But there are some complexities to this problem
of consideration. Our discussion below will prove that what
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can count for, or as, consideration can be in the eyes of the
law, some very unusual things .^
Hamer v. Sidway^
At the occasion of the golden wedding anniversary
of Mr. and Mrs. Samuel Story their son, William Sr., promised
his nephew William Jr., that if young William would "refrain
from drinking, using tobacco, swearing, and playing cards or
billiards for money until he became twenty-one years of age
. . . "he, William Sr., would give him five thousand dollars.-^
Young William accepted the conditions of the agreement and
performed in accordance with it. At age twenty-one William
wrote to Uncle William for the money but Uncle insisted
that he wait a while, that he would hold it in safekeeping
for his nephew, but told his nephew not to worry for the money
was surely his. Twelve years later Uncle William died, having
paid none of the money over to his nephew. His nephew in
the meantime had assigned the debt to a third party (a gam-
bling debt?), who then brought suit against Uncle William's
estate and the hard-hearted executor.
At the trial defendant-executor contended that
n the contract was without consideration to support it, and
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(was) therefore But the case was decided in favor
of the plaintiff. Judge Parker speaking for a majority of
the Court of Appeals of New York felt that the defendant re-
quired a broader view of what can constitute reasonable con-
sideration. He wrote:
A valuable consideration in the sense of the law may
consist either in some right, interest, profit, or
benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance,
detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered, or
undertaken by the other. 20
Thus, benefits on both sides is not a necessary condition
for an enforceable contract. It is sufficient that one
party be made to 'suffer' in a broad sense, upon justified
reliance on the words or conduct of another party:
Consideration may mean not so much that one party is
profiting as that the other abandons some legal right
in the present, or limits his legal freedom of action
in the future, as an inducement for the promise of
the first.^-1-
It was determined that young William had so abandoned or
limited his legal rights and legal freedom under this defi-
nition so as to enable him to recover.
It must be emphasized that the decisive fact in
this case was not the promise of the uncle but the conduct
of the nephew in reliance upon that promise. The mere fact
of promise only indicated an intention to benefit but without
performance on the other side this intention or promise to
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benefit would have been without consideration and could not
be a promise enforceable in the law. Promises by themselves
do not generally give rise to obligation in the law unless,
such promises are acted upon or relied upon. Where no con-
dition is set in the promise, there is no obligation, for
there we have a mere gratuity. In this case the obligation
arose vis-a-vis the conduct of the party promised. It was
the response, through subsequent behavior, to the promise
which made the promise enforceable.
Devecmon v. Shaw^2
This case, merely an expansion of the rule of Hamer
concerned another uncle-nephew relationship. A nephew lived
with his uncle and for a number of years was in his employ
as a clerk. The uncle requested the nephew to take a pleasure
journey to Europe for which the nephew was to pay but the
uncle promised him that he would be reimbursed at a later
time. The nephew took the trip and spent his own money as
requested. The uncle died before reimbursing him, and the
executor of the estate being unwilling to pay found himself
in court on the complaint of the nephew.
There was no question in this case, as there was
none in Hamer, of there being reliance by one party on the pro
mise of another. But there was some question in the mind of
the executor and a minority of the court, the Court of Appeals
of the state of Maryland, as to whether the nephew had 'given
up anything’, had been made to 'suffer' in reliance upon the
promise. Judge Bryan, speaking for the majority, found that
there was sufficient detriment in that the plaintiff spent
his money "in this way, instead of some other mode. Thus,
the nephew won the case and collected.
As was mentioned above, this case merely illustrates
how the rule of Hamer is extended. It points up again that
the enforcement of promises by the law is not to be understood
as a judicial device for signalling the sacredness, or prima
facie rightness, or 'self-evident' rightness of promises
themselves, but rather, is to be understood as signalling
the importance of conduct undertaken in reliance upon such
promise. It is not the saying of words that somehow imme-
diately binds; it is the action of another in reliance upon
those words which must be the decisive fact. This principle
is profoundly set forth in the next case, a case before one




Miss Blanche Schweizer was engaged to be married to
Count Oberto Giacomo Giovanni Francesco Maria Gulinelli. On
January 16, 1902, Blanche's father executed a written agree-
ment by which he promised and agreed to pay to Blanche
"during his own life and to send her during her lifetime
the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars, the first pay-
ment of said amount to be made on the twentieth of January,
1902." J There was language in the agreement to the effect
that this promise was being made in consideration of the fact
that Blanche and the Count were about to be married. Blanche's
father made the first payment and continued payments up until
January of 1912. At that point although a significant amount
of the balance remained, Mr. Schweizer refused to make any
more payments. Mr. Schweizer was brought to court for the
balance by an assignee of Blanche.
Defendant Schweizer insisted that the promise was
without consideration, that it was a mere gratuity, that no
reliance nor detriment was 'suffered' by plaintiff's assignors
on the promise because "Count Gulinelli was already affianced
to Miss Schweizer and the marriage was merely the fulfillment
of an existing legal duty. "26 There was, in fact, no con-
dition mentioned in the agreement that the parties were re-
ceiving this for getting married or i_f they would get married.
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Defendant took this line of argument in response to plaintiff's
contention that proof of the reliance of Blanche was attested
to by the fact that she married the Count. The question thus
put to the court was whether there was sufficient evidence
to find reliance on the part of Blanche by the act of marriage
to constitute sufficient consideration and an enforceable agree
ment. The case went to the Court of Appeals of New York where
the majority spoke through Judge Cardozo.
For Cardozo there were two major questions to be
answered: a) was it reasonably inferrable that reliance upon
the promise became an inducement to get married?; and b) if
such hypothesis is reasonably inferrable, should Blanche's
father be forced to pay? In dealing with the first question,
Cardozo reexamined the document signed by the father and
the context surrounding the signing.
The document, according to Cardozo, argues that
"the promise was intended to affect the conduct not of one




the very formality of the document suggests a purpose
to affect the legal relations of the parties."2B "One does
not commonly pledge oneself to generosity in the language of
a covenant."29 Thus, Cardozo would counter the ’gratuity'
assertion of the defendant and argue that the promise was
54
intended by the promisor to be a promise which could be relied
upon. But, as to whether such reliance did take place Car-
dozo gives no certain opinion. Nevertheless, although it is
not absolutely clear that they did rely, neither is it clear
that they did not. To this raising of the question of the
burden of proof on this issue Cardozo issues an admonition
to the defendants:
The springs of conduct are subtle and varied. One who
meddles with them must not insist upon too nice a measure
of proof that the spring which he released was effective
to the exclusion of all others.30
A conclusion of reliance is reasonably inferrable. Given the
reasonableness of the opposite inference, however, Cardozo
needs further grounds to justify a finding for the plaintiff.
This second question is answered by further consideration of
the fact of the defendant's meddling. An important legal
attitude and judgment is revealed by Cardozo's words:
It (the law) strains, if need be, to the uttermost the
interpretation of equivocal words and conduct in the
effort to hold men to the honourable fulfillment of
engagements designed to influence in their deepest
relations the lives of others.3l
Given that the fact of reliance was not established but in-
ference about it was possible either way, the fact that the
subject matter of the situation was so important, that the
action of the parties may well have been motivated by the
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promise, and this action was of great significance, becomes
the decisive fact. He who speaks in promise, and by his
speaking opens up the possibility that others, in reliance
upon his words, will act, speaks at the peril of being taken
seriously.
In the cases of Hamer and Devecmon there was no
question but that the promisees had relied upon the words
of the promisors, but in this case, no such obvious con-
clusion follows. Reliance usually must be proved. Here it
was not; it was only reasonably inferrable. The extension
of Hamer and Devecmon occasioned by DeCicco can be understood
in the following way. Not only does the situation wherein
a promisee obviously relies on the words of the promisor
give rise to an obligation for the promisor, such obligation
can be and is imposed when it is reasonably inferrable that a
party's words may have been the spring of another party's
action. All these cases insist that parties should get the
benefits they expect when their expectation, given the words
of another, is reasonable.
Conclusion to Section Two
Once again in these cases, as in the cases in
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section one, the subjective intention to be obligated, or the
subjective recognition of obligation, is not dispositive of
the question of whether such party is obligated. Usually, of
course, as we have seen, it works the other way. Parties,
here the two executors and Mr. Schweizer, apparently do not
recognize their obligations to the injured parties but this
is not proof that there are no such obligations in the si-
tuation. The court finds it quite reasonable and meaningful
to tell Mr. Schweizer that he has an obligation which he
does not 'feel' or 'sense'. Whether there is such an obligation
turns on the resolution of other issues.
In these cases we see the law pointing to the im-
portance of a) words spoken by one party to another which
words express, by reasonable inference, an intention to bene-
fit the parties spoken to and b) the action or conduct entered
into because of such words, to the determination of whether
or not obligation is present in the situation. Once again,
attention is directed to the character of the interaction
between parties and to the effects of that interaction. In
the cases in section one we looked to the interaction and
asked, ’Who was benefited by it?'. Here, we look to the
interaction and ask, ’Who was burdened by it?'.
What is now beginning to become evident is that the
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law recognizes that it is to the character and consequences
of forms of human interaction undertaken by parties for the
purpose of self-improvement or benefit, that attention must
be directed if we want to know how obligations arise. It is
to this interaction, the intentions and actions of the parties
toward each other; and to its consequences, the benefiting
or burdening of parties, that the gaze of the court must be
drawn, given the court's purpose of assigning and locating
obligation and responsibility. The passage taken from
Cardozo's opinion contains the basic insight supporting such
attention. It is because men deal with each other, and by
such dealings are influenced deeply in their lives, that such
objective circumstances of the situation--the intentions of
parties, their conduct, and the benefits or burdens conse-
quent to interaction--must be taken into account; for it is
these dealings and interactions which in the judgement of the
community must be preserved, and in order to be preserved
must function according to acceptable standards. This pre-
liminary speculation about the 'why' of judicial focus will
be expanded only much later in the argument; it is only men-
tioned now out of deference to the suggestiveness of Cardozo's
remark.
As a conclusion to this section, we only remark, as
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we did in the conclusion to the first section, that the focus
of the judicial eye is clearer by means of the presentation
of the cases, although the reason or justification for that
focus is not yet apparent. We need more evidence before
that case is made.
Section Three
The Relevance of the Relative Bargaining Position of Parties,
A Kind of Difference of Status, to the Imposition of Obligation
o o
Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Insurance Company^
Weininger was a fur dealer. To protect himself
against loss he took out a fire insurance policy with the
Metropolitan Fire Insurance Company. In the policy given to
Weininger there was an express provision which rendered the
insurance coverage void if "the insured should keep gasoline
or benzine on the premises."33 Weininger accepted and signed
the policy with full knowledge of its contents. Weininger's
establishment was later destroyed by fire. On inspecting the
premises, a member of the fire patrol found a gallon of gaso-
line which Weininger's employees had been using to clean the
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merchandise. The gasoline was found, however, in a portion of
the store not on fire. Weininger sought to collect from the
insurance company but using the provision mentioned above
defensively, they refused. Weininger brought suit against
the company, and an Illinois Court, hearing the case on
appeal found for him.
The justification of the court's finding seemed to
rest on the determination of two issues: a) a finding of the
fact, and b) a decision of policy. First, in regard to the
fact situation the court felt that it did not necessarily
reveal a violation of the provision:
The keeping and using of such volatiles (ja single gallon
of gasoline] on the premises for necessary use in the
complainant’s business was such a slight departure from
the provisions of the policy that there was no breach
therefor. 34
But this determination of 'fact 1 only follows if policies
are to be read and understood in a certain way. There would
be many ways to so read and understand such policies but the
procedure of this court is to admit its initial ambiguity
vis-a-vis this problem and to resolve the ambiguity in a
consistent way. Thus, the court admits that it is not clear
whether the provision was violated but given such unclarity
the decision follows readily:
It is the rule that the policy or contract of insurance
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is to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and
strictly against the company.3s
Thus, what is relevant is who it is that is doing the bar-
gaining; that is what is the decisive issue in this case.
Attention to the relative size and power of the parties ap-
pears to carry significant weight.
o c
Campbell Soup Company v. Wentz
The brothers Wentz, farmers in Pennsylvania, made
an agreement with the Campbell Soup Company "for delivery by
the Wentzes to Campbell of all the Chantenay red cored carrots
to be grown on fifteen acres of the Wentz farm during the
1947 season. The contract provided that the Wentzes
a) would deliver the carrots with stalks cut off and in clean
sanitary bags approved by Campbell, b) would have to abide
refusal by Campbell of carrots in excess of twelve tons to
the acres, and c) would have to abide by Campbell’s refusal,
in any situation, to accept the carrots and in that event,
"while he cannot say Campbell is liable for failure
to take the carrots, he is not permitted to sell them else-
Campbell simply agreed to buy what it approved of,
grown by the Wentzes. After some brief period of performance
by both parties, the Wentzes stopped delivery. Campbell
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brought suit for specific performance of the contract. The
lower (district) court found for the Wentzes and refused to
rule specific performance. Campbell took its appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Judge Goodrich of the Third Circuit spoke for the
majority, upholding the lower court’s decision. In Goodrich's
opinion he referred to the three provisions of the contract
mentioned above. Referring specifically to provision c),
he commented:
This is the kind of provision which the late [Judgej
Bohlen would call "carrying a good joke too far." What
the grower may do with his products under the circum-
stances is not clear. He has covenanted not to store it
anywhere except on his own farm and also not to sell to
anyone else. 39
To say that it is a seemingly unfair and unreasonable pro-
vision is, however, not to say that it must be unenforceable.
There is a third way of looking at the problem according to
Goodrich:
We are not suggesting that the contract is illegal.
Nor are we suggesting any excuse for the grower in this
case who has deliberately broken an agreement entered
into with Campbell. We do think, however, that a party
who has offered and succeeded in getting an agreement
as tough as this one is, should not come to a chancellor
and ask court help in the enforcement of its terms. That
equity does not enforce unconscionable bargains is too
well established to require elaborate citation. . . . All
we say is that the sum total of its provisions drives
too hard a bargain for a court of conscience to assist.^
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Goodrich later refers to the fact that in the contracts made
for the purpose of setting up agreements between Campbell and
individual growers, there is a standard form made by Campbell
which "has quite obviously been drawn by skillful draftsmen
with the buyer's interests in mind. "4-1
The conclusion about the unenforceability of the
agreement vis-a-vis its being 'unconscionable', seems to con-
sist of a warning by the court to Campbell that since it is
able to come to the bargaining table with the power and intent
to coerce, it will be treated harshly at the hands of the law
when a dispute concerning the agreement arises. It is possible
to consider the court's ruling of unconscionability to have
to do solely with the terms of the agreement and not with
the 'status' of the party who drew it up. But, it is, of
course, unlikely that any but a more than equal party would
be able to get away with such an agreement, so that issue
with 'unconscionable terms' usually means judgment in respect
to the superior bargaining power of one party. This case
shows a judicial inclination to focus on the unequal power
of one party, which power is exercised coercively, as an
important factor in considering obligation, here resulting
in a judgment releasing a party from obligation.
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v. Bloomfield Mot or s^-2
This landmark case concerns the purchase and sale of
an automobile. Henningsen bought his wife a new Plymouth.
Two weeks after the sale Mrs. Henningsen was injured when
the car suddenly veered and smashed into a brick wall. Mr.
Henningsen brought suit both against the dealer, Bloomfield
Motors, and the manufacturer, Chrysler Corporation, for the
damages incurred. He insisted that there was an implied
warranty of merchantability attached to the sale of the car,
and that such a warranty was violated by the obvious defects
of the car. The defendants insisted that no such warranty
existed. On the lower court level, the Henningsens won,
but final determination of the case--all important for future
cases of this type, and of great importance to our inquiry--will
be given in some detail.
Bloomfield and Chrysler defended on the expected
basis that the degree and nature of warranty for the automo-
bile appeared on the back of the purchase order signed by both
parties. The language of the warranty agreement was as follows:
7. It is expressly agreed that there are no warranties,
express or implied, made by either the dealer or the
manufacturer on the motor vehicle, chassis or parts
furnished here-under except as follows.
The manufacturer warrants each new motor vehicle
• . .
to be free from defects in material or workmanship
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under normal use and service. Its obligation under this
warranty being limited to making good at its factory any
part or parts thereof which shall be returned to it with
transportation charges prepaid . . . this warranty being
expressly in lieu of all other warranties express or im-
plied, and all other obligations or liabilities on its
part. 4-3
In short, the company will make good failures of function in
the automobile if the car is operated under normal use and
service and if the buyer gets the parts of the car to the
factory his own cost. Major faults could, under this
contract, require the buyer to ship the engine to the fac-
tory at his cost, and pay for its return. The company as-
serted and proved that the Henningsens knew of this provision
when they signed the contract. But to Judge Francis of the
New Jersey Court other considerations were to be taken into
account.
Francis's opinion contains much reference to the
problems of bargaining in the modern economic world. Tra-
ditionally, as Francis says, a contract was the result of
the free bargaining of parties who stood on approximately
equal footing. But this tradition and this situation no
longer apply. Francis writes:
But in present day commercial life the standardized
mass contract has appeared. It is used primarily by
enterprises with strong bargaining power and position.
The weaker party in need of the goods or services, is
frequently not in a position to shop around for better
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terms, either because the author of the standard contract
has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all
competitors use the same clauses. His contractual in-
tention is but a subjection more or less voluntary to
terms dictated by the stronger party. 4-4
Such a subjection, in Francis's mind exists between auto-
mobile manufacturer and individual consumer:
The status of the automobile industry is unique. Manu-
facturers are few in number and strong in bargaining
position. . . . From the standpoint of the purchaser
there can be no arms length negotiation on the subject.
Because his capacity for bargaining is so grossly un-
equal, the inexorable condition which follows is that
he is not permitted to bargain at all. He must take
or leave the automobile on the warranty terms dictated
by the maker. 4-5
The realization of such inequities requires, for the interests
of the common good, that courts step into the situation and
attempt to heal the damage done by the inequity:
Courts keep in mind the principle that the best interests
of society demand that persons should not be unnecessarily
restricted in their freedom to contract. But they do
not hesitate to declare void as against public policy
contractual provisions which clearly tend to the injury
of the public in some way.^6
Francis and a majority found for Henningsen, asserted that
an implied warranty did exist, and helped to change the shape
of such policies throughout the automobile industry.
We can single out for emphasis the important ele-
ments of the opinion. First, we have witnessed the rise of
enormous corporation which issues to the public standardized
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contracts obviously written with the corporation’s advantage
in mind. Second, such a situation reveals a threat to the
freedom of contractual dealing. Third, the real point of
decision for Francis is: such contracts will be declared
void when they violate or endanger free contractual dealing
to a serious extent. From a judgment about the power of the
corporation or company which power is manifested in its con-
tract the court imposes a stringent obligation upon the com-
pany requiring of it a fairer provision. The focus is on
the practice of large corporations, coercive practice mani-
festing unequal bargaining power.
The court looks to the interaction of parties,
again, to the character of that interaction, and to its
effects. The character of the interaction is here obvious.
The intentions of the parties are manifest in their conduct.
A large company intends to get all it can from the relatively
helpless individual. The effects of interaction are obvious.
In the language of benefits and burdens, one party gets great
benefits and few burdens, the other limited benefits and
enormous burdens. Most important, by the evidence of these
effects, coercion is revealed, and a threat to free contractual
dealing emerges. Coercion, a consequence of power manifested,
is the decisive fact of the case.
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Conclusion to Section Three
In the cases of Weininger and Wentz attention to
the power and practice of large corporations brought, finally,
a release from obligation for the parties who appeared to
have a prima facie obligation to the other party. In Henningsen,
an obligation was imposed upon a party who, by clear inference
from the agreement, appeared to have none. Once again the
finality of written agreements is undercut in favor of more
fundamental issues. Again, the focus is not on what was said
or written down or explicitly promised; but rather, on the
nature and effects of interaction. Such focus is present with
a view, as we mentioned in the conclusion to section two,
to the preservation of beneficial forms of interaction and
the standards required therefor. One standard apparently
important to the law is that such interaction be free, and
the focus on the size and power of the stronger parties in
these cases is appropriate for maintenance of the standard.
In summary we witness the courts considering
a) the size and power of the parties, a feature of the inter-
action, and b) the effect of the size and power of the parties,
coercion, an effect traceable to a feature of the interaction,
as the decisive elements of the case. Consideration of these
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factors forms the basis for the imposition of, or release from,
obligation. In conclusion, we know that the law judges that
a) the fact of unequal bargaining power and b) the fact that
such unequal bargaining power produces an unequal distribution
of benefits and burdens, suggest the presence of coercion and
reveals a threat to free bargaining. Such suggestion and
revelation are decisive, in these cases, of the obligation issue
Section Four
Summary: The Focus of the Law in the Determination of
Obligation
The cases we have considered have revealed the
law's concern to focus on certain issues in the determination
of obligation for parties, who, by their words or conduct,
form agreements with each other for benefit. The elements
of situations listed below form the dispositive subject
matter for these cases. It was the answering of these
questions which led to the imposition of, or release from,
obligation:
1. Did a party receive benefits because of the non
gratuitous action of another party?
2. What were the intentions of the parties as manifested
in their words or conduct?
3. Did a party, acting upon reasonable inference from
the words or conduct of another, act to his detriment?
4. Was unequal bargaining power exercised coercively?
Now it is not claimed that the answering of such
questions will always, in cases in the law, be determinative
of the 'obligation issue'. We have only considered certain
recurrent problems in the law and have focused on considerations
which frequently determine the respective rights and duties
of parties. But the cases and the questions do suggest
(what we have been arguing all along) a definite perspective
on the problem of obligation. Inquiry into whether obli-
gations are present takes place by means of asking and an-
swering questions like the above. We must now see whether
it is possible to more precisely define this focus of the
law, whether all these questions point to a single charac-
teristic judgment.
It is the benefiting and burdening of parties through,
because of, or by means of, the words, conduct and action of
other parties, which defines the important fact to which the
law is drawn in its assignment of obligation. It is a fact
of the interconnectedness of men in human society that they
both benefit and burden each other by words and actions, and
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to find a means whereby such benefiting and burdening can take
place most fruitfully for society has appeared to be the task
of the law. But these underlying reasons, this pervasive ra-
tionale, will be disclosed more fully in the next chapter. For
the time being we were only concerned to witness the law in
its activity of assigning obligation. By means of this pre-
sentation it is already possible to make some preliminary
comparisons between the view of the law and the view of the
theories we presented in chapter one, on the issue of obligation
Section Five
Preliminary Reply to Prichard and Ross
We can use the instruction from the law to challenge
and comment on some of the conclusions of Ross and Prichard
noted in chapter one.
First, to Prichard's insistence that we must take
the meaning of the presence of obligation in a situation to be
equivalent to the fact that an individual has a feeling that
he is obligated, the cases we have presented offer contrary
evidence. Crisan perhaps provides the best example. Mrs.
Crisan nor her estate nor its executor felt or sensed such
obligation. The court felt that it was meaningful to speak of
the presence of obligation without reference to anyone's feel-
ings except perhaps, its own. It is obvious that the courts
do not subscribe to a form of the subjective view which argues
that an individual must feel obligated to be obligated. Obli-
gation of the Crisan estate did not depend upon such a 'sub-
jective fact' about Mrs. Crisan as Prichard urged. It depended
upon the fact that Mrs. Crisan received non-gratuitously gi-
ven benefits and that an implied promise to pay arose given
the likelihood of her consent. The 'implied promise' is not
a statement about anyone's feelings. The justification for
positing such a promise is, again, made by reference to the
objective, 'public', facts of the situation.
Secondly, Prichard holds that argument and discussion
are preliminary to the appreciation of obligation, that "in-
dividuals do not come to appreciate an obligation by argument.
This contention is not challenged by the evidence presented
here. What is sought in the law, of course, is not primarily
the realization of a party’s obligation by the party but the
determination of obligation despite, regardless of, the in-
dividual's appreciation of it. It may be the case that an
individual cannot appreciate an obligation by argument; but
it is obvious that from the point of view of the courts it is
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possible and practical to speak of obligation without reference
to the feelings of him who is said to be 'under' the obligation.
How obligation is spoken of by the courts is, of course, quite
different from how it is spoken of by Prichard. In the way
the courts speak of it, discussion and argument do stop at
some point. Before the full role and function of argument
and discussion are revealed by the argument in the next chapter,
it cannot be shown how far they can go. Nevertheless, when
one takes a different perspective on the problem of obligation
such as the perspective taken by the law, argument and dis-
cussion are seen, must be seen, to serve a different purpose
than that assigned to them from the Prichardian point of view.
Thirdly, the courts, like Ross, seem to believe that
promises ought to be kept. Ross insists that the keeping of
promises is a prima facie duty revealed as self-evident to
the mentally mature and attentive. The perspective and pro-
cedure of the law cannot, at this point, offer any improve-
ment upon the Rossian limitation, for we have not seen any
argument in general about why promises made should be kept.
We have arrived, through the discussion of obligation in the
law, at the Rossian point. Only if we can get behind the
court’s insistence that promises be kept can our claim, made
in chapter one, that Ross prematurely invokes ’self-evidence'
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and 'intuition', be justified. We have not moved beyond the
point yet at which Ross invoked self-evidence.
Fourthly, to Ross's claim that there are no general
rules for choosing between prima facie duties something can be
said at this point. ■ Ross does not know where, in a hierarchy
of prima facie duties, to place, for example, the duty of
keeping promises. The law flatly states in the cases in
section three, Weininger, Wentz, and Henningsen, that when a
promise if kept would foster the encouragement of coerced agree-
ments, then the promise-keeping duty must give way. A priority
in favor of encouragement of free, uncoerced, agreements is
announced. Why it is announced, the rationale for the priority,
is not clear, but the court announces it confidently. If a
rationale for this judgment can be provided then the appeal
to self-evidence can be put off.
But the resolution of this problem, like the reso-
lution of the problems raised by the other three comments,
must await further delineation of the perspective offered in
contrast to those of Prichard and Ross. It has not been
demonstrated at this point in our argument that the criticisms
made of Prichard and Ross in chapter one are justified. Pre-
cisely, to the question of the point at which discussion and
argument must cease and the inquirer is to appeal to intuition,
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this point has not yet been clearly marked out. When the ar-
gument is able to present the evidence relevant to the making
of that case, the same evidence will be significantly probative
for the more particular questions we have just raised.
Section Six
Conclusion to Chapter Two
The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate the
approach of the law to the problem of obligation by giving
examples of the law assigning obligations to parties in in-
dividual cases. This has been done. We have seen the kinds
of issues which the law considers important. We have seen the
relative position of parties in regard to benefits and burdens
following preliminary explicit or implicit agreements is
where the law focuses in its task of assigning obligation.
We have suggested that such a focus possesses a rationale,
and that this rationale has to do with the setting of stan-
dards for certain kinds of human interaction.
In addition to the presentation of the outlook of
the law, we have made preliminary criticism of the postulates
of certain of the theories considered in chapter one, by
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virtue of the postition the judgments and opinions in the cases
has afforded us. The everyday activity of the law provides
evidence of men attempting to reason about obligation. The
task now is to formulate reasons for the direction and charac-
ter of this judicial reasoning. We have seen that the law
has a definite perspective on the problem of determing and
assigning obligation; we must now discover why it has the
focus it does, and how it justifies having such focus. Such
discovery will take us beyond judicial reasoning, beyond the
usual reasoning of judges of law.
Chapter Three
The Meaning and Justification of
Societal Obligation
Introduction
This chapter has two purposes. First, we seek to
understand why the courts focus on the issues they do, the
focus evidenced in chapter two. This investigation is be-
yond the scope of reasoning of courts of law whose function
it is to decide individual cases, not to indulge in the jus-
tification for the rules and principles it employs. Second,
we want to know what relevance such an investigation has for
understanding moral obligation. The answers needed will
lead us to posit and explain certain societal obligations.
Some Problems in, and Requirements of, Social Interaction
We recognize that it is by the making of bargains,
agreements, and formal and informal contracts that men and
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societies grow, benefit, and prosper. We are concerned to keep
alive such growth, benefit, and prosperity, and so ought to be
concerned to keep operative the means by which such ends are
achieved. The reason that such bargains, agreements, and con-
tracts are considered to be worthwhile is emphasized by Locke,
quoting Hooker:
"But for as much as we are not sufficient to furnish
ourselves with competent store of things needed for
such a life as our natures doth desire, a life fit
for the dignity of man, therefore to supply these defects
and imperfections which are in us, as living singly
and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to
seek communion and fellowship with others; this was
the cause of men uniting themselves at first in politic
societies."l
To Locke the formation of politic society is to provide a
life for man commensurate with his dignity. But, one can
view the situation somewhat differently as, for example,
Hobbes did in Leviathan. The formation of that state or so-
ciety is less for the purpose of a life of dignity than for
a more fundamental aim. He writes:
The final, cause, end, or design of men, who naturally
love liberty and dominion over others, in the introduction
of that restraint upon themselves in which we see them
live in commonwealths is the foresight of their own pre-
servation, and of a more contented life thereby--that
is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable
condition of war which is necessarily consequent . . .
to the natural passions of men when there is no visible
power to keep them in awe and tie them by fear of pun-
ishment to the performance of their covenants. 2
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The mutual benefiting of men which comes first, in the for-
mation of politic society or commonwealth, can be understood
as either sort of benefit; that is, the agreement to live
together and to cooperate is seen as a benefit no matter
how one characterizes such benefit. Philosophers, with few
3
exceptions, have subscribed to this truth.
Once together, living in the bonds of the social
contract or commonwealth, further agreement, bargain, and
contract fosters well-being. This obvious truth, were it
not for its central importance to the purpose of the inquiry,
would scarcely require mention. This fact about our life
with each other is at the basis of our theory of obligation.
A justification of obligation is made intelligible by virtue
of the fact that the community is concerned to encourage the
making of such agreements and bargains which are the means to
the increase of benefits.
We now take a Hobbist turn, or a turn, if not li-
mited in its direction to the thought of Hobbes, is a turn
that nevertheless sees in the absence of certain requirements
by the community an invitation to catastrophe. For we said
earlier, in chapter two, that the preservation of certain
sorts of social interaction requires conformity to certain
standards. Unless the community imposes certain standards
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by means of which human interaction, by agreement, bargain,
and contract, can be regulated, the interaction will change
its character, the means whereby benefits accrue to individuals
and society will falter, or cease altogether. Precisely, the
powerful will subject the weaker to their will; the benefits
will fall on one side, and the weaker will cease to have any
substantial advantage in entering politic society. Unless
there by rules of interaction in the affairs of men, the purpose
of politic society is frustrated, and men are returned to
the state of nature, the state of war in Hobbes, an incom-
plete state, an insufficient state, for Locke. The natural-
ness of self-interest, the pervasiveness of men seeking be-
nefits for themselves, makes the entrance into politic society
intelligible. But this same self-interest, this seeking of
benefits, if left unchecked, will be pursued individually at
the cost of drastic loss of benefit to many. Men naturally
seek benefits for themselves. For this reason they enter
politic society, and once in politic society if left to get
what they can with no restraint offered by the community the
purpose or aim of politic society will be frustrated.
The community which is aware of the truth of these
assertions must, therefore, offer and impose a variety of
means, certain standards of interaction. Given its aim of
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preserving itself and providing a means of benefit accrual for
individuals, it must posit aims more particular than the achieve
ment of benefits which will serve that aim. It must do at
least two things. First, it must encourage the making and
keeping of agreements, bargains and the like. Second, it must
discourage the making of coercive agreements. These require-
ments will be considered separately, in some detail.
Why the Community Must Encourage the Making and Keeping of
Agreements
The community ought to encourage the making of agree-
ments, first because such agreements work to the benefiting
of individuals. These benefits are understood as the effects
of those received objects of choice and desire of individuals.
Collectively or individually the community which encourages
and fosters agreement-making encourages the means whereby
individuals gain those benefits. The community must be con-
cerned with the keeping of agreements because it is only by
such keeping that the benefits sought can be realized and the
continuation of bargaining for benefit be encouraged. If
an agreement is not kept by one party but is kept by another
the law of self-interest may encourage the defaulting party
to default again, and the party who did keep the agreement
may be wary about making future agreements. Such results
threaten the continued existence of politic society in accor-
dance with its purposes. The party who kept the agreement
gains no benefit thereby, and becoming wary of agreement
again, limits his future opportunities for benefit. The
party defaulting is encouraged to default again and contri-
butes to the return to a state of nature. In short, the
very end that was eschewed reappears. Of course, this out-
come is possible only if the community fails to enforce the
agreements made. If it does impose and enforce standards,
one being that agreements be kept, then the ride of self-
interest is short. The reasons for the community to en-
courage the making and keeping of agreements are obvious.
Less obvious but more interesting is how a community with
these ends should go about working toward their realization.
How the Community Encourages the Making and Keeping of
Agreements
First, the community encourages future making of
agreements which are beneficial, as defined by the individuals,
by enforcing the agreements which have already been made
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but are left unkept. Thus, the wary party denied or fearful
of being denied benefit is encouraged to make agreements in
the future when he understands that agreements past and future
will be enforced. When the self-interest of the opposite
party is counterbalanced with the imposition upon him of
enforcement, the wary party is made secure.
Second, the community encourages the keeping of
particular agreements by enforcing the agreement if it is not
kept. Censure, or disapproval or fine or punishment can re-
define the character of the defaulting party's self-interest.
The purpose of enforcement is, of course, the bringing
of benefits to all parties. But if the end is to bring such
benefits to all parties then the community ought to do more.
If a party has provided a benefit for another party but would
not provide this benefit if he did not get a benefit in return,
then the community ought to find some way for providing this
first party with a compensatory benefit. The community does
this because it wants to encourage parties providing other
parties with benefits. Thus, the community ought to be 'agree-
ment-sensitive'; it ought to try to find agreements between
parties when one has benefited the other and the other recog-
nizes or should recognize a benefit. If the community is
not 'agreement-sensitive' and only takes as agreements what
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are obviously agreements, i.e., explicit, written, signed and
sealed agreements, then it discourages the fostering of bene-
fits for parties, for the party providing benefits will pro-
bably stop providing them if he does not receive a benefit
in return.
In conclusion the community finds it consistent
with its ends to encourage the making and keeping of agree-
ments. Such encouragement takes place by a) enforcing agree-
ments which are made and b) by being 'agreement-sensitive',
by trying to find an agreement wherever it can, especially
in those cases where one party benefits another and would
stop such benefiting were he not to receive a benefit in return
Why the Community Must Discourage the Making of Coercive
Agreements
The community must discourage the making of coercive
agreements because such agreements reflect a state of affairs
inconsistent with the aims of politic society. The reasons
are really the same as those in the last two sections. If
coercive agreements are made and are allowed to stand, the
rule of the stronger again dominates. The coercing party
will continue to coerce, benefits will fall more and more
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on one side, and the aims of society are frustrated. Further,
given the fact that men seek to benefit themselves and pursue
such benefits by means of agreement, the fact of coercion, the
fact that the individual did not freely enter into the agree-
ment, suggests that the agreement does not inure to his benefit.
But, a coerced agreement may contain limited benefits for the
party coerced. If so the community's reasons for discouraging
the making of coercive agreements are nevertheless undiminished.
To allow coercive agreements even where the coerced party has
limited benefits as a result, is nevertheless an invitation
to further coercion, and given the postulate about the per-
vasiveness of self-interest and proclivity to seek first for
self, an invitation to that state of affairs where the strong
rule and rule through strength.
How the Community Discourages the Making of Coercive
Agreements
The community discourages the making of coercive
agreements by .not allowing them to stand, by refusing to
enforce their conditions.
We can now see that it makes sense for the community
which wishes to preserve itself as a framework for interaction
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within which individuals can benefit themselves must a) enforce
agreements that are made between individuals, b) be 'agreement-
sensitive', i.e., look to find an agreement when a party be-
nefits through the non-gratuitously given efforts of another,
and c) disallow coerced agreements. We must now see what all
this has to do with obligation.
Obligation and the Community
Requirements of individuals in the community, as
members of the community, to act in such a way that the
community may be preserved may be called societal obligations.
These obligations are the minimal obligations of men living
together in society. The relationship between such require-
ments and the preservation of the community has been brought
out in the preceding section. The preservation of the community
means the preservation of a frame of interaction wherein in-
dividuals may benefit by association and agreement. The re-
quirements are therefore understood as a means of preserving
a frame of interaction for individuals so they may benefit.
But a community which does not provide the conditions for
individuals to benefit within it in the present is not a
community which deserves to be Requirements are
86
seen therefore as necessary to the fulfillment of the aims of
the community in the present and to the continued existence of
such a community in the future. It is absurd to speak of the
preservation of a community which will provide a frame of
interaction for individuals to benefit in the future when
what exists in the present is a frame of interaction which
does not encourage such benefits. The community which is to
be preserved must be one which deserves to be preserved. The
community so deserves which, in the present, provides for the
benefiting of individuals. That the community be preserved
means therefore the imposition of obligations upon individuals
in the present.
The community's creation of obligation thus has an
eye on present conformity to the aims of the community, and
on the possibility of future realization of those aims. An
individual is obligated in the present, for by such means is
the aim of the community realized, i.e., the benefiting of
all members, and is obligated because were he not, the pos-
sibility of a future 'benefiting community' is made less
likely. To have operative a means whereby benefits and bur-
dens can be shared--usually by mere enforcement of an agree-
ment, but occasionally by implying an agreement, or nullifying
a coercive agreement--is to have the present aim of the
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community realized, and the possibility of a future benefiting
community made more likely. It is the natural self-seeking of
men in a community, their choice of benefits over burdens, and
the aim of the community to insure a frame of interaction
wherein benefits can be shared, and hence where burdens must
be shared, that creates obligations. Or, the general demand
that the community realize its aims and be preserved so rea-
lizing these aims has the effect of imposing a particular de-
mand upon an individual when his self-seeking resists that
demand, or merely operates in disregard of it. Because the
community cannot trust such self-seeking to be the sole
regulator of interaction within the community, it requires
of men that they act in such a way that the realization of
benefits for others, present and future, is not impaired.
These requirements are obligations.
This is an argument disclosing what obligations
are, and how and why they arise. But what is the community
making this argument? And to whom is the argument made?
We must say something about these issues before going further.
How Can It Be Said That the Community Makes This Argument?
It can be said that the community propounds this
88
argument because although strictly speaking a community is not
a person or a philosopher, it can be understood as the collec-
tive voice of rational men who live within that community. To
speak of a community arguing is merely a way of speaking about
the arguments which are advanced by individuals within that,
or some other, community, which arguments support the aims
and purposes of living in a community, and reveal what is
required if such aims and purposes are to be realized. Thus,
any individual who can see that it is good to live in a com-
munity, and that therefore there must be requirements set
down for the continuation of such community, can be the author
of the argument. Simply, it is rational to both see the need
for such requirements and to argue for their imposition. By
virtue of certain truths agreed upon by rational men the ar-
gument for the imposition of such requirements, the argument
for obligation, follows.
To Whom Is This Argument Offered?
The community offers this argument to anyone who
wants to know about obligation. This can be a) someone like
the Crisan executor in Crisan or the father in DeCicco, who
having heard the argument of the court seeks to know why, in
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general, individuals must be brought before the court and made
to follow through on their agreements. The argument goes be-
yond that which was heard in court; it explains why the law
has the focus it does, always concentrating on benefits and
burdens vis-a-vis interaction between parties.
But the argument may also serve to enlighten b) one
who does not stand before the judgment of the community. It
may answer the problem of the philosopher who seeks to know
what obligations are and where they come from. This argument,
following some reflection on what we know to be true, can
answer those questions. It is, theoretically, available
to the judge as well as to the philosopher responding to a
question about the nature of obligation. It tries to say
what can be said; it goes as far as it can to find a rationale
for obligation. But we must now see how far that is.
Obligation and Rationality
To indicate the extent to which discussion and
argument can be employed to determine the presence or the
absence of obligation in a situation, let us construct a
hypothetical situation which contains many of the relevant
issues at stake in the inquiry. Let us imagine Mr. Schweizer
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standing before Judge Cardozo. Schweizer insists that he does
not feel such an obligation. Cardozo answers that Schweizer
does have an obligation to the plaintiff despite, regardless
of, how he feels. Cardozo makes his remarks about the 'springs
of action' and 'equivocal words and conduct'. Schweizer is
not moved. "Why should it be," he asks, "that because others
may have relied on my words and conduct, relied to their detri-
ment, that I should be forced to pay, found obligated to them?"
The argument we have put forward, we presume, is made avail-
able to Cardozo. "Because," Cardozo answers, "these indivi-
duals like others in the community may be reluctant to act
again in the future, to act again for future benefits by ma-
king agreements if they cannot believe that their agreements
are of effect. To deny them the effects of their agreements
is to deny them the benefits of living in a community. The
aims of the community are thereby frustrated. Further, to
allow you to be free to leave this agreement is to encourage
you and others, who we know are interested more in benefits
for themselves than for others, to abandon agreements again
and thus not suffer burdens under them. When agreements like
this have no effect but to benefit one side, or to unfairly
burden one side, then the making of agreements becomes a
risky business. When agreements become risky to make, people
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hesitate to make them, and when they hesitate to make them
they hesitate to bring about benefits for themselves. Thus,
their aim and our aim in living in a community is frustrated.”
But Schweizer is still not convinced„ "But why," he asks, "do
we care about the community? Why should I care about the
community either realizing the aim of providing a means whereby
individuals may benefit themselves now, or about the contin-
uation of such a community?" This is a very difficult question
It is important to consider how Cardozo might answer it.
This question seeks a justificication for the justi-
fication. That is, we have attempted to justify the perspec-
tive of the law in assigning obligations by an appeal to cer-
tain fundamental facts about human society and certain truths
about human behavior in such societies. Such an appeal has
resulted in an argument for the focus and perspective of the
law which we observed in operation in chapter two. But now
it is asked, through the hypothetical, what is the argument
for the argument. Once the situation is reached where the
individual, here, Mr. Schweizer, admits that unless his agree-
ment in enforced, the community is frustrated to some extent
in realizing its aims, and the preservation of that community
is endangered, but asks why such an argument should convince
him, him who (let us postulate) is near death, who is thus
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not to be appeased by arguments for his own future benefits,
what is left to be said? There are, it seems two possible
ways to answer this question.
First, we may have to appeal to intuition, we may
be forced to insist of Mr. Schweizer that he admit that a
community which provides for the achievement of benefits for
its members is better than the destruction of that community,
and that because it is better he must see that it is right
that it be preserved. Any man of normal intelligence will
see that it is right for men to have a community within which
they may all benefit rather than to have a state where only
the strong survive by preying on the weak. By virtue of
agreeing to this, to the rightness of this state of affairs,
Mr. Schweizer's final objection to the imposition of obli-
gation upon him can be met.
A second response to Mr. Schweizer's question would
suggest that Mr. Schweizer has contracted to care for the con-
tinuation of the community. Mr. Schweizer has received bene-
fits from the community--it has protected him and nurtured
him, it has given him language and speech, education and the
power to reason and make agreements for his benefit. Like
Crisan the agreement is here implied for although Mr. Schweizer
never explicitly agreed to pay back the community for its
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trouble it is reasonable to assume that he would have so agreed,
like Crisan, had the choice been given to him. In short, he
must abide by the agreement with his daughter and son-in-law
because he agreed to abide by such agreements in his, by his,
agreement with the community. This agreement was, in one
sense, reminiscent of Prichard, an agreement not to use noises
except in a certain way. Whether we demand of Schweizer that
he grant the 'prima facie' rightness of holding men to their
agreements with other men when not to hold frustrates the aim
of the community, or whether we insist that he abide by his
agreements to other men by virtue of his implied agreement
to keep agreements, this is the end of the road and the end
of the argument. This is the limit for discussion and argu-
ment in response to the skeptic.
We conclude this section by some summary remarks
about the source and justification of obligation. The source
of an obligation is the community itself. Obligations arise
from the community, by living in the community, by virtue of
the requirements the community must impose upon its members
if the community is to achieve its end of providing a means
for the benefiting of individuals. The justification of an
obligation is, finally, the individual's assent to the right-
ness of preserving such a community either by reference to
some intuition of his, or to his implied agreement to so pre-
serve the community. No obligation arises for an individual
who does not live and never has lived, among other men. No
obligation can be justified to. him except by reference to some
prior affirmation or agreement on his part. To him who re-
fuses to admit such affirmation or agreement, it can only be
said that such affirmation or agreement is implied. But there
is no more to be said, to him.
Before it is possible to evaluate our theory of ob-
ligation and to compare it with the theories put forward in
chapter one, we must show that it is moral obligation as well
as legal obligation which we have been arguing about. We
now proceed to this task and await a summary of our position
at the end of the chapter.
Societal Obligations as Moral Obligations
These societal obligations are moral obligations.
They apply to all individuals benefiting from social inter-
action; for those who benefit by living, or by having lived,
in a society, there is no way to avoid the imposition of such
requirements. The individual who benefits is not free to act
as if the conditions which enable him to benefit are conditions
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which he is free to neglect. Recognition of the necessity of
these obligations places them in a position of priority. These
obligations when adhered to provide the conditions necessary
to further and fuller social interaction. They provide for
the growth of society and for the variety of human interactions
without which life would not be worth living. They are general
They are ineluctable. They are of fundamental importance.
Such characteristics justify considering them as 'moral' ob-
ligations .
But whatever they are called they must be recognized.
The skeptic may balk at the use of the term 'moral', but he
cannot resist what must be seen. Here is a category of ob-
ligations which demands the attention of anyone who reflects
about the necessities of life, when men live with each other.
The failure to live up to one’s obligations is al-
ways damaging to the social order. The society is diminished,
by virtue of its aims, whenever any individual fails to live
up to his obligations when that failure is known. And to
the argument that the society is not diminished when one fails
to act on one's obligation and that failure is never recognized,
is never known, there are two responses. First, there is
always the possibility that the failure will be discovered.
One can rarely be certain that his violations of promise to
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others will go unnoticed. Secondly, the individual who opts
to secretly violate his contract with society by such option
violates the perspective on his actions which he (impliedly)
promised to take. The asking of the egoistic question in a
context in which the issue is one of obligations to others is
inappropriate. He must be reminded of his implied promise
to take a perspective other than one which specifies only
where his interest lies.
Although societal obligations are moral obligations,
it is not true that all moral obligations are societal ob-
ligations. A fuller idea of what constitutes life with others
requires a filling in of features of social interaction not
discussed here. Other obligations emerge from other activities
engaged in by men once the activities aimed at meeting so-
cietal obligations are consummated.
Societal Obligations and Legal Obligations
These societal obligations are the minimal obli-
gations upon which the more particular legal obligations rest.
Without the argument presented in explanation of the societal
obligations, the rationale of the courts in assigning obli-
gation, as illustrated in chapter two, is absent. That legal
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obligations 'rest' on societal obligations is disclosed by re-
ferring to the necessity for justifying the power given to the
courts, official organs of power in the society. The justi-
fication for the operation of institutional power is based
on a recognition of the necessity for a means of enforcing
societal obligations. Necessity of adherence justifies a
means of enforcement. The legitimacy of legal institutions
depends on the implied consent of those subject to the legal
order, consent to the exercise of power for the end of pre-
serving a framework of interaction for those consenting. There
is a moral justification for the operations of legal insti-
tutions .
In regard to the problem of distinguishing moral
from legal obligations it must be noted that there is no
self-evident distinction between those acts, in violation
of one's obligation to others, which should or should not
be subject to legal sanction. That is, it is not obvious
for which breaches of obligation legal institutions should
provide remedy. An examination of the definition of 'contract'
offered by The Restatement of Contracts reveals the wide area
of choice:
A contract is a promise or set of promises for breach
of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of
which the law in some way recognizes a duty.^
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Considerations labeled under the catch-all phrase 'reasons of
public policy' may dictate where and when the legal institution
should refrain from providing institutional settlement of con-
flict arising out of breach of obligations. Such considerations
include most notably (in my opinion), situations in which ju-
dicial probing would effect an intrusion into the areas of
privacy of individual lives with which the law should not be
concerned. 6 in those situations, however, a procedure like
that of adjudication can, with good reason, be recommended to
the parties involved.
Response to Skepticism
To the skepticism which questions whether there are
any obligations at all, the preceding argument responds by
pointing out certain obvious facts of social life. Recognition
of these 'facts' requires the recognition of obligations. To
the skepticism which questions whether there are obligations
in particular situations the argument responds by pointing
out that the 'particular situation' of living in society de-
mands recognition of the presence of obligation in, at least,
that situation. Further, the argument demands that in those
situations wherein the factors, already enumerated at length
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earlier in this chapter, are present, obligations arise. If
the skeptic would persist in his skepticism he must take on
the burden of proof and demonstrate where and how the argu-
ment presented earlier in this chapter fails.
Response to Prichard and Ross
It is now appropriate to review our criticisms of
Prichard and Ross, summarized at the end of chapter one, in
order to discover whether we have improved upon their theories.
The first criticism made there of Prichard and Ross was that
they failed to establish satisfactory criteria for resolving
situations of conflict and ignorance in regard to obligation(s)
The response to Prichard and Ross is similar to the
response made to the second form of skepticism noted above.
To him who lives in society and who questions, or is ignorant
of, whether he has obligations or not, the argument as a whole
is offered to rid him of his ignorance. Second, to Ross's
doubt about the relative stringency of duties some suggestion
of a hierarchy of duties is present by means of the arguments
in the third section of chapter two supported by the argument
in the beginning of this chapter. That is, for example, it
is the case that the duty to keep a promise is, generally, of
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less stringency than the duty to keep a coerced promise from
being carried into effect. To maximize free uncoerced dealing
it may be necessary to violate a promise. If so, the duty to
keep a promise gives way.
But finally, to Prichard and Ross--a general re-
sponse--the argument of the second and third chapters provides
clues to what factors should be considered as relevant when one
is in a sitaution and is ignorant or confused or both, in re-
gard to whether he is obligated to another or another to him.
Although the need for creative judgment in such situations is
not eliminated, for the application of rules to situations is
always 'open-textured', the argument has provided information
as to what rules should be consulted by creative intelligence
in such situations.^
In our second criticism in chapter one we noted that
Prichard and Ross do not establish satisfactory criteria for
the marking off of the point or place at which discussion
and argument cease to be useful in answering the skeptic and
intuition must take over. The argument, especially our hy-
pothetical dialogue between Schweizer and Cardozo, marks this
place beyond that suggested by either Prichard or Ross, and
marks it clearly as the end of the road.
Further, in regard to the second criticism, we
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suggested a problem in chapter two in discussion of Prichard's
rebuttal to the legal examples. We suggested there that Pri-
chard might respond to the supposedly 'objective' theory of
obligation supported by the cases, that we had merely substi-
tuted the judge's intuition or apprehension for that of the
parties. But at this point we can see that the opinion is
not so much a matter of the judge's intuition as of the rea-
soned voice of the community speaking through one of its offi-
cial spokesmen. We view the judge's opinion not as a spon-
taneous report of his feelings or intuitions but as an attempt
to apply the reasoned requirements of interaction laid down
by the community to a particular situation. Such reasonings
are available to the judge. We view the judge's opinion as
intelligent understanding of the conditions of individual and
communal existence. To see that such a position is tenable,
the reader is referred back to Cardozo's opinion in DeCicco.
The great judge is acutely sensitive to these conditions of
individual and communal existence and is acutely aware of
his responsibility to judge in accordance with his recognition
Finally, we said in chapter one that Prichard and
Ross, by concentrating on the subjective apprehension of
intuition ignored a dimension of obligation equally relevant
to understanding what it is men call their obligations. This
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dimension has been revealed by the argument in these last two
chapters. Only the reader can judge whether such argument
is relevant to understanding what it is men call their obli-
gations. I think he must judge it so. We need not be limited
to the dimensions revealed by Prichard and Ross.
Conclusion
We must refer back to chapter one to Frankena's re-
marks about the required scope of an inquiry which is aimed at
resolving the issues between 'externalisin' and 'internalism'.
Frankena said that "the battle could not be contained," that
a broader scope was needed which would include within it
questions about the relation of morality to society and of so-
ft
ciety to the individual. He argued that small-scale semi-
logical arguments could be of only limited value in answering
the skeptic's doubts about obligation. We have taken Fran-
kena 's advice and have broadened the inquiry. The results
are valuable enough, I submit, to support the criticism of-
fered about the theories of Prichard and Ross. Their theories
though valuable are too narrowly and too restrictively conceived
We must now take our theory, preceding final eval-
uation of it, and put it to work for us. We need new examples
and applications. And, we need to say something more about
those moral obligations, which though dependent upon a con-
dition in society wherein societal obligations are met, are
not themselves societal obligations.
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Chapter Four
The Theory of Obligation Applied
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to test our theory
of obligation to see whether and with what degree of helpful-
ness it can be employed. We want to look at particular si-
tuations and kinds of situations to discover whether the ra-
tionale we have provided can be of help in determining the
'obligation content' of situations. Our first example, the
problem of Socrates in the Crito, is a classic situation in
which to consider the problem. The answers Socrates himself
gives to the questions of Crito and the Laws are support for
our theory and in this way the example serves two purposes.
Given the situation in the Crito, is our rationale reasonable?
Can it be applied? The argument of Socrates supports our
argument. It can be applied.
Following this discussion we will suggest where and
how our theory can be applied by considering some issues and
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situations within which the obligation question arises; these
issues and situations were chosen because of their relevance
to contemporary issues about obligation.
After this we will suggest how the application of
our theory reveals its boundaries. It will be argued that
the theory is indeed applicable, and applicable with good
and valuable result, but, nevertheless, its application is
limited. There are questions about morals which reference
to our theory will not help answer. We must point out the
limitations of a theory of societal obligation in disclosing
the full spectrum of issues within the subject matter of morals
and moral obligation.
Obligation in the Crito
Crito comes to Socrates in prison and offers a plan
of escape. In considering his options, Socrates attempts to
discover what his obligation is in the situation. It will
be useful to point out how Socrates proceeds with this inquiry.
Those aspects of the situation upon which Socrates focuses are,
by now, quite familiar.
Socrates imagines the Laws coming to speak to him.
The Laws understand that Socrates contemplates escape. They
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ask him why he plans such a thing:
Come now Socrates, what charges do you bring against us
and the state that you are trying to destroy us? Did we
not give you life in the first place? Was it not through
us that your father married your mother and begot you?
Tell us, have you any complaint against those of us laws
that deal with marriage?!
The Laws insist that Socrates ' escape would be both an act
aimed at destruction of the state and the laws and an act of
betrayal, given how much the laws and the state have done for
him. The Laws argue that Socrates has an obligation not to
do this. But what is the evidence for this obligation? The
Laws would have Socrates recall the benefits they and the
state have provided for him:
Well have you any complaints against the laws which
deal with children’s upbringing and education such as
you yourself had? Are you not grateful to those of us
laws which were instituted for this end, for requiring
your father to give you a cultural and physical edu-
cation . . . ? Then since you have been born and brought
up and educated, can you deny, in the first place, that
you were our child and servant, both you and your an-
cestors ?2
The Laws recall to Socrates' mind the enormous benefits he
has received from them. Recognition of such benefits reveals
the great importance of the community--the state and its
laws--and point to its priority as a provider of benefits
even before those benefits given by father and mother. The
Laws ask:
Are you so wise as to have forgotten that compared with
your mother and father and all the rest of your ancestors
your country is something far more precious, more venerable,
more sacred, and held in greater honor both among gods
and among all reasonable men? 3
The community being the condition by means of which a parent
is able to provide opportunities for benefit to the child, it
holds the prominent place, and ought to hold the prominent
place in the eyes of one of its progeny. Any man who is rea-
sonable, the Laws argue, can recognize this.
But given that Socrates ought to revere the law for
the benefits it has bestowed upon him, does it follow that
he must not violate its edict? How does evidence of benefits
reveal grounds for implying a promise? Socrates surely never
explicitly promised the Laws or the state that he would al-
ways obey them, but the Laws do not limit themselves to that
requirement for their argument. They speak again to Socrates:
We have substantial evidence that you are satisfied with
us and with the state. You would not have been so ex-
ceptionally reluctant to cross the borders of your country
if you had not been exceptionally attached to it. . . .
Are we or are we not speaking the truth when we say that
you have undertaken in deed if not in word, to live your
life as a citizen in obedience to us?^
A promise implied by 'deed* or conduct is sufficient in the
eyes of the Laws. This point is emphasized again:
But we say that every man of you who remains here seeing
how we administer justice and how we govern the state in
other matters has agreed by the very fact of remaining
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here to do whatever we tell him. 5
The Laws reveal to Socrates their focus upon the benefits he
has received and the promise they imply from him by virtue
of his acceptance of those benefits. They then argue that
they are committed to take such a view as they urge Socrates
to consider what would be the result of his failure to abide
by this implied promise. They ask:
Now Socrates what are you proposing to do? Can you deny
that by this act which you are contemplating you intend,
so far as you have the power to destroy us, the laws,
and the whole state as well? Do you imagine that a city
can continue to exist and not be turned upside down, if
the legal judgments which are pronounced in it have no
force but are nullified and destroyed by private persons?^
How can a city continue to be the source of provision of be-
nefits for its members if its members do not observe certain
rules of interaction? The Laws, providing Socrates with an
account of the benefits he has received from them, now
question him about the possibility of continuation of such
benefits for present and future citizens presuming Socrates
'
failure to perform on his promise.
Finally, the Laws announce to Socrates that a wrong
is being done to him, not by the Laws themselves but by those
who apply them, but this does not constitute a justification
for destroying the fabric of lawfulness without which no
society, city, state, community, can survive. They say:
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As it is, you will leave this place, when you do as the
victim of a wrong done not by us, the laws, but by your
fellow men.^
That same self-interest and disregard of others in view of
which the community imposes standards, and which, left to its
own law will turn upside down the state and its purposes, is
not incapable of creeping into the regulation and application
of the requirements of the community and in so doing can
contaminate the processes from which justice proceeds. The
determination of obligation requires human judgment, and the
intimacy of reason and self-interest, as pointed out by James
o
Madison, always constitutes a threat to the community. In
the case of Socrates it finally produced a verdict of death.
Socrates speaking through the laws directs his
attention to the effect of interaction with the state in terras
of benefits and burdens. Discovering benefits and an implied
agreement he judges himself to be subject to obligation to the
state and to perform according to its expectation, its rea-
sonable reliance upon his conduct. It is interesting to note
that the three elements focused upon in the cases in chapter
two and brought out again in chapter three in discussion of
the rationale of obligation reappear here. Socrates' under-
standing of obligation, spoken by the Laws, necessitates a
commitment to these operative concepts. The Laws insist
a) that agreements be kept--because Socrates has promised he
ought to perform on that promise, b) that he, Socrates, be
'agreement-sensitive', that he look, given the presence of
benefits, to his words and conduct to see if an agreement
can be implied, and c) that no element of coercion is operating
to cancel the agreement. This last is suggested by the Laws'
remarks that Socrates was quite willing and eager to stay in
Athens, that he was not coerced into staying but freely chose
to remain. The significance of the reappearance of these
rules is to illustrate how they may be quite fundamental to
the analysis of obligation, that they perhaps more than other
rules recognized by the law, are useful, prima facie at least,
for detecting the presence of obligation. We shall see their
applicability in other contexts.
Other Applications of a Theory of Obligation
A transition from the example of Socrates to other
situations in which questions about obligation can arise is
easily afforded when we consider the contemporary problem and
dispute about the individual's responsibility to his country.
Today this problem arises in this country due to the waging
of an undeclared, and as believed by many, immoral war. The
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problem of the draft concerns most of our young people today;
it forces many of them to reexamine fundamental questions about
the nature and degree of one's obligation to his country. Let
us presume the question is 'Does one have an obligation to his
country and is there at least a prima facie responsibility to
obey its edicts?'. If one does not feel or sense such an ob-
ligation, is there anything left to be said? Can our theory
speak to this problem?
An answer to both problems can be given by applying
our theory to the problem. Let us look to benefits and bur-
dens as a consequence of initial interaction between the state
and the citizen. Has the individual received benefits from
the state? Indeed the answer to this question is as obvious
as it was in the hypothetical case we constructed in which
Cardozo spoke to Schweizer, and in the example of the Crito.
Life, language, security, protection, the power of thought,
unimpeded movement, privacy, association, education are some
of the things afforded the individual by the community in
which he lives. These must be considered benefits.
But let us imagine an objection. The individual
insists that the effect of interaction between him and the
state has led to a burdening of the individual. He complains
that as a result of living in this community, of interacting
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with this state, he has become unhappy, alienated, exploitative,
selfish, insensitive, dirty, and generally incapable of 'rela-
ting' to other people. Thus, he argues, as a result of such
bargaining, such initial interaction with the state, he has
become severely burdened and it is now the state's responsibi-
lity to benefit him. He does not seek great benefit he insists;
he does not seek a payment of a large sum of money; he seeks
only, let us presume, to be left alone. What are the merits
of the case? Has our analysis left us with nothing to say on
an all-important and fundamental question of obligation?
Questions of obligation, whether they be before
courts or simply the 'conceptus communis
1 sitting in no offi-
cial public capacity, are not resolved simply by application
of principles. One cannot leave his common sense and intelli-
gence behind when he enters the inquiry. Such common sense
and intelligence reveals the flaw in the citizen's argument.
It is not at all clear that what he asserts are burdens are
such, given the potentialities of life outside the state or
community. It is not clear that the net effect of interaction
with the state has been a burdening, in fact, the converse is
true. Where is the support for the belief that a life outside
of the community, is better than, more ennobling, more bene-
fiting, happier, than life within one? Can the expenditure
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of all energies in the battle merely to survive be considered
a life with fewer burdens? We must compare the state of the
individual in the community with the state of the individual
in some sort of state of nature. However seriously one takes
the individual's argument that he has been burdened (and this
argument, this outrage must be taken seriously by those who
value the future of society), one cannot agree that the net
effect of interaction is burden rather than benefit. The con-
clusion is that the net effect of interaction is benefit for
the individual. But, were the benefits given non-gratuitously;
were they given with an expectation of compensation?
If the community did not give its benefits non-gra-
tuitously it would not give them at all. It would make no
sense to give them. If the purpose of the community in pro-
viding its benefits is not, in part, the attempt to preserve
the community, then it would not demand that the conditions
for preserving the community be maintained. But by its de-
mand it aims to preserve and perpetuate its existence and by
this demand indicates its non-gratuitous intent. We have the
presence of benefits and the presence of non-gratuitous intent.
According to our theory, we must now be 'agreement-
sensitive'. Is it possible to find an implied agreement by
reference to the words or conduct of the citizen? Let us
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employ the Crisan test. It is Crisan which must be considered
the most relevant given the situation of the party here at or
during the initial stage of interaction. He was an infant, a
child, and not like Austin or Day capable of understanding that
benefits were being given to him and given to him non-gratu-
itously. He was more like Mrs. Crisan who was unconscious of
what was being provided her. In Crisan the court made exten-
sive reference to the Restatement of Contracts. We shall cite
again the all important provisions of that document, all im-
portant to the disposition of this case as well as to Crisan:
A person who has supplied things or services to another,
although acting without the other's knowledge or consent,
is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if,
a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge
therefor, and
b) the things or services were necessary to prevent the
other from suffering serious bodily harm or pain, and
c) the person supplying them had no reason to know that
the other would not consent to receiving them if
mentally competent; and
d) it was impossible for the other to give consent or
because of extreme youth or mental impairment, the
other's consent would have been immaterial. 9
We must examine whether our cases can be considered to fall
under the intent of this provision.
The state certainly fits the requirements laid down
in the provision. It acts without the infant’s consent, it
acts with 'intent to charge'. The child on the other hand,
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the infant citizen, receives services necessary to prevent harm
and pain, or at least without the protection and help of so-
ciety, harm and pain become much more likely prospects for the
individual. The state certainly 'has no reason to know that
the other would not consent if he could'. Given the enormous
benefits it provides, cannot the state reasonably assume that
the individual would consent if he was capable of understanding
his options? Would anyone choose to reject the benefits we
have listed, only in part, above? Such a conclusion leads
to the judgment that the state, in this case, is entitled to
the restitution it demands. The judgment must be that the
individual has an obligation to the state to obey its edicts.
It must be pointed out, however, that this response
only serves to answer one question: is there an obligation
on the part of the individual to obey the state? The answer
is yes, but this answer may not, and in most cases, will not,
dispose of the issue of what course of action an individual
should take. We are absenting other factors to come to a
determination of one of the important factors in a case. But
let us presume that the final issue in the case is whether an
individual should be obligated, should conceive of himself as
having an obligation, to fight in an undeclared war. One of
the questions to be determined in the disposition of this
case is the question we have been considering. But, there are
other questions. Our theory tells us what to look at, what to
look for, what are the kinds of factors which are relevant,
but, it cannot at first glance, determine for complex situations,
what the recommended parameters of action are."^
Staying with this example for a moment longer, the
individual can argue that the state's promise to abide by law-
ful procedures in dealing with its own citizens in the context
of waging war has been violated by its action. Does a state
which violates its own laws thereby contribute to its own
destruction? Does the individual have an obligation to con-
tribute to that self-destruction by submitting to military
service in that war? This kind of question must also be
taken into account. All of the questions must, as we have
argued, look at the actions of the parties vis-a-vis each
other--What was agreed upon? What were the benefits and
burdens consequent to such agreement? But, let us apply
the general rule which we argued for earlier. The community,
the rational members of the community, must decide what
requirements are necessary in this context to preserve a
community which provides a means of benefiting its members
and to maintain such a community now. We must reflect about
the conflicting obligations in this case and decide that we
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are obligated to do that which will contribute to this end more
significantly. We only know where to look, we don't as yet
know what the final result should be. In some ways this ex-
ample is the best we can give. It shows both the strengths
and limitations of the theory. It brings us back to the com-
plexities of real situations which, since chapter two, have
been lacking in representation.
We must consider the important implications of re-
commending that individuals, in deliberating about obligation,
consider the effects of interaction in terms of benefits and
burdens and the reasonable inference from conduct in inter-
action, as possessing significance over and beyond explicit
agreements and words. There is much left unsaid between
individuals who are lovers and friends which can give rise
to the imposition of obligation. Relationships between nations
can also give rise to such effects as reasonable reliance upon
the reasonable implications from conduct. The fact that in-
dividuals will become suspicious of making future agreements
when the ones they make earlier are not performed nor enforced
is clearly evidenced by reference to the political scene.
The cynicism which accompanies the occasion of political
speeches is an indication of the unwillingness of individuals
to agree again (to trust and believe is how one agrees in
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this context), to the offer of the speech-maker. How cheapened
political talk by men who would be taken seriously has become
because the failure to carry through on their earlier agree-
ments has not been 'enforced' by loud outcry from the offerees,
their constituents. Such evidence discloses a failure to apply
a concept of obligation to situations which, by virtue of their
importance, should always be viewed with an 'obligation-sen-
sitive' eye. To apply this theory of obligation consistently
would be to become sensitive to effects and consequences of
interaction which in large part are left ignored.
But is such a moral squint to be seriously recom-
mended? Would not commitment to this principle and consis-
tent application of it lead to a kind of moral hysteria? Would
not the moral issue, the obligation issue, be raised too often?
Moral maturity it is said is indicated by knowing when to
raise the moral issue and when not, and presumably this means
that it is not raised all the time. But would not the accep-
tance of our view require such an obsession?
Despite the attractiveness of the notion that we
may offer a rule for applying the rule of this theory, it
cannot be done. Whether an issue is to be brought under such
consideration as we have recommended cannot be resolved by a
general theoretical direction. To answer the question 'When
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should the theory be applied?' by saying that it should be
applied when a question of obligation arises is not much help,
but is about all that can be said. A theory like this is likely
to suffer from the same sort of misconception that is frequently
discovered in discussion of Kant's theory of the categorical
imperative. Kant does not insist that every act one under-
takes be scrutinized beforehand for its conformity to the law
of reason. Nor does this theory suggest that every act be
scrutinized beforehand for its possible effects on the con-
tinued well-being of a community. Attention to the fact
that one is a member of a community, that by one's actions
one affects the state or condition of other individuals with
whom one more immediately interacts, need not mean myopia to
the other values of life, nor sole obsession with the community.
We must recognize the place of societal obligation in the con-
text of other values. We will now speak to this problem be-
cause it says something about the boundaries of our inquiry.
The Boundaries of Societal Obligation
To speak merely about the community and to speak
merely about societal obligation is not to speak of all the
relevant factors or features of what we might call the moral
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dimensions of experience. A theory of societal obligation is
not a theory of the moral life. There are moral obligations
which are not societal obligations. A theory about societal
obligations is not a theory about all moral obligations. There
are more things to be thought of than one's requirements which
arise because one lives in a community.
A community within which men can interact and by
such interaction benefit themselves deserves the attention
and care of the men who live within it, but there comes a time
when given a relatively stable record of performance of their
societal obligations, other obligations arise. We insist on
having more than a community by means of which individuals
can accrue benefits. We may decide that we should have be-
nefits of a certain sort, and only then perhaps is the com-
munity worth dying for. We may be concerned, in addition to
preserving the community, to preserve a community of a certain
type, with a certain character, with a certain quality.
In regard to individuals our concern to evaluate
their action is not limited to whether or not they perform
on their agreements. All of the questions which men are in-
clined to ask about each other are not resolved by determining
whether one keeps his agreements. Let us consider the father
and daughter in DeCicco. We have judged that the father is
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under an obligation to his daughter. How much does this tell
us about the father and his character? Can we presume to judge
him as an evil or bad person, on the basis of what we know,
the knowledge merely that he is not willing to fulfill an ob-
ligation to his daughter? We cannot so presume. We need to
know more. Nor do we know whether he is interesting, sensi-
tive, thoughtful, a good drinking companion, or any of a host
of other things which we may regard as important.
A theory of obligation like ours says nothing about
certain questions with which philosophers have frequently been
concerned. We do not have a theory of virtue. We do not as-
sume that people who keep their agreements are, ipso facto,
virtuous although we may want to say that men who do not keep
their agreements are not virtuous. Would mere performance on
the part of the father in DeCicco for as long as he did per-
form, evidence virtue on his part? It would not, nor would
it tell us whether the father for as long as he did perform
was worthy of respect. Was he a creature deserving of dignity?
Was he autonomous? Was he loving and loyal? All these questions
are not answered and cannot be answered by reference to the




We began this chapter with the example and argument
of Socrates in the Crito. This example provides support for
our theory. The Socratic theory appropriately places the
focus of the Laws on the same elements revealed and discussed
in chapters two and three. The times have changed significantly
since the days of Socrates
' Athens but the character of human
desire and the requirements of politic society remain the
same. This was brought out by the second example, the question
about a contemporary individual's obligation to his society.
The same issues are relevant, the same factors are to be taken
into account.
In proceeding with our discussion of the application
of the theory we maintained that a theory of societal obli-
gation is not a theory of the moral life nor the good life.
The importance of societal obligations is not diminished when
they are juxtaposed with other values and other obligations.
It is simply that life with other men is more complex and
more profound than living up to one's societal obligations.
To determine finally the place of societal obligations
in the context of other values we must, as Frankena would rec-
ommend, open up the boundaries of inquiry. Our inquiry is
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too narrow to deal successfully with that question. Again
we could say with Frankena, that the battle here is indeed
the whole world and nothing short of a commitment of all our
resources can be expected to bring a satisfactory result.
Chapter Five
Summary and Conclusion
A Unified Theory of Obligation--Summary and Reflections
Societal obligations are requirements that indivi-
duals act so that the realization of present and future bene-
fits for others is not impaired. Such requirements arise
because men live, and would live, in a community and can
be taken to agree, as rational beings, to the preservation
and continuation of that community. Situations disclose the
presence of obligation by reference to the effects of inter-
action of parties, who live in society, in terms of benefits
and burdens. The claim that one has an obligation is justified
when one shows that unless a course of action is pursued or
abandoned, the community, in its task of providing a means of
benefit for individuals, is hindered, either from doing its
task presently or in the future. These effects are concomi-
tant because the failure in the present to provide for the
achievement of benefits for individuals threatens, given the
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way men act, the continuation of the means whereby individuals
benefit, which means is the very rationale for the existence
of the community itself. Simply, men interact. Unless there
be rules of interaction, such interaction will fail to bring
about what is sought by men. Rules of interaction in the
judgment of the community, produce requirements. These re-
quirements are obligations.
We set as antagonists in this inquiry, first, a
state of affairs wherein the law of self-interest describes
the motivation of individuals and reveals the character of
interaction. Self-interest is left unchecked. There is no
agreement; there is no community, and hence there are no
obligations. On the other side is a community; there is an
agreement by men that they will abide by certain rules for
the purpose of their own and others' benefit. Here there
is agreement and there are obligations. We began our ar-
gument by placing ourselves right in the middle of this
community and square in the operation of the imposition of
obligation by this community in the context of the courtroom.
As we tried to find a rationale for such imposition we con-
sidered the state of nature described above. It is the choice
of community and submission to rules of interaction within
it which brought us back, away from this state of nature,
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back to the courtroom, to its pronouncements, and beyond.
It appears from what Socrates says in the Crito that
the choice between community and state of nature for one who
lives and grows in a community, is not a real choice. To
make a choice possible a state of affairs must be present
in which the choice is not taken away by reference to an
implied promise. The present members of communities can de-
stroy those communities to give future individuals the choice
between community or no community and obligation and no ob-
ligation. The only question is, for what reason should we
exchange the reality of an implied promise for the possibility
of an explicit one? We may judge it more considerate of the
needs and wants of future generations to impose upon them
obligations by reference to implied promises than to allow
them the possibility of choosing explicitly whether they
would live together or not. For although that explicit choice,
is possible only in a state of nature, we must consider whether
the benefits of the possibility of that choice outweigh the
burdens concomitant with that possibility.^
Obligations and Lawfu lness
To move from consideration of obligation in the
court of law is not to move to a context where there are no
obligations. We have said that there are moral obligations
which are not legal obligations. The difference between what
we might want to call legal and moral obligation, is at least
that for moral obligation there is no official judge and jury,
no publicly authorized authority, no courtroom and many of the
procedures that go with judgment in a courtroom. But there is
a judge and there ought to be rational judgment. There ought
to be appeal to precedent and appeal to the community's well-
being. To see lawfulness as a disposition to view situations
in the way we have described, whether it be within or without
a courtroom, is to see that the presence of a judge and jury
is no guarantee of lawfulness as surely as the absence of a
publicly appointed and authorized judge and jury need not
imply the absence of lawfulness. The life of law rests
finally in the systematic procedures of determining case by
case the responsibility of individuals to each other indi-
vidually and collectively with a view to the preservation of
a frame of interaction whereby they may benefit.
To view the law as the simple operation of force or
power, to view it as the 'gunman situation writ large' is to
fail to see that the law, as opposed to the gunman in the
gunman situation has a justification for its exercise of power.^
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To take the law simply as there, as a given datum, as an exer-
cise of power is a consequence of the same kind of thinking
that takes obligations as simply there, as given data of
experience. The fatal effect of such a view is that no dis-
tinction is made between legitimate and illegitimate exercise
of power on the one hand, and feelings of obligation and ob-
ligations on the other. To lose this distinction is, for the
former, to predicate right on power, and for the latter, to
predicate 'right' on idiosyncrasy. To the former conclusion
we can only insist that failure or powerlessness is not evi-
dence of failure to be right; and to the latter that inten-
sity of feeling is no evidence of correctness of feeling.
But we do not merely insist that these assertions are correct.
We insist that these assertions can be supported. The task
of our inquiry has been to support this latter insistence.
The reader must now evaluate the evidence, and come to his
own conclusion.
An Adequate Theory of Obligation
At the end of chapter one we advanced criteria for
an adequate theory of obligation. Those criteria have been
met. We have explained what is meant by saying one has an
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obligation to another, have demonstrated that it is true to
say that individuals have obligations to others, and have
shown how this claim is supported. We suggested how the pres-
ence of obligation, societal obligation does not exclude the
presence of other obligations in situations. We have shown
that there are relations between individuals other than that
of societal obligation.
Beyond this we have tried to show that inquiries
need not be limited in the way of Prichard and Ross. It is
not that limited inquiries are wrong; our inquiry itself is
limited but it is not wrong. The problem with Prichard and
Ross and the skeptic whose doubts occasioned this inquiry is,
that if we judge from what they say, they fail to recognize
a dimension of obligation which is important. Perhaps the
major problem revealed in the poverty of recent ethical
philosophy is like the major problem of another sort of poverty.
The worst thing about poverty according to Ralph Ellison
is not that one merely lacks goods; it is rather that one
defines oneself and one's goals in such a terribly narrow
and limited way. 3 Such narrowness and limitation in definition
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example, the skeptic should consult the
following arguments:
a) Plato, Gorgias, especially 482-487.
b) Plato, The Republic.
c) A helpful distinction for questions of this
type is made by Kant in Chapter II of the
"Transcendental Analytic" of the Critique
of Pure Reason. This distinction is between
questions of right (quid juris) and questions
of fact (quid facti). Kant, interestingly,
refers to the language of jurists in discussing
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this distinction.
d) A contemporary article of interest on the subject
is William Kneale, "Objectivity in Morals,"
Philosophy, XXV, (1950).
Chapter One
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Obligation, see chapter entitled "Duty and
Ignorance of Fact," pp. 37-38.
Obligation, see chapter entitled "Does Moral
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Obligation, see chapter entitled "The Ob
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Obligation, see chapter entitled "Does Moral
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13w.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, (London: Oxford
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Chapter Two
"Understanding the concept of obligation in the law
of contracts is, in my opinion, revelatory of the concept of
obligation throughout the Anglo-American Law. Law itself has
a contractual basis as we shall argue later on. It is inter-
esting to note that philosophies of law which tend to empha-
size the authoritative aspects of law tend to use the model
of the criminal law. I think this is what Hart constantly
has in mind throughout his writings. Although Hart and his
works must be taken seriously, for he is most informative,
I think that his failure to see the contractual basis of
Anglo-American Law accounts for his neglect of such features
as reciprocity between law maker and those subject to the law.
Law is more interactive between law maker and subject than
the 'rules of recognition' paradigm suggests.
The criminal law can be understood as part of the
contract between the individual and the state wherein the in-
dividual agrees to let the state punish him by virtue of the
burdens he places upon the community. The necessity of con-
sent or agreement generally for the existence of law will be
brought out in chapters three through five.
It seems that the usual theoretical contrast is the
understanding of the law as authority or the understanding of
law as agreement. Authority views, like those of Austin and
Hobbes, emphasize the law as a power. Law in this understand-
ing takes on a paternalistic character. On the other hand,
philosophies of law which emphasize the agreement aspect,
theories like that of Socrates in the Crito which we will
discuss in chapter four, and in contemporary jurisprudence,
a view like Lon Fuller's (see The Morality of Law and The Law
In Quest of Itself) see the law as a contract between citizens
and the community.
I think it can make a great deal of practical dif-
ference which view one takes. A paternalistic philosophy of
law is found in the Soviet Union (cf. Harold Berman, Justice
in the USSR) while in the United States we still suscribe to
a contractual notion by and large (cf. Holmes, The Common Law)
Given paternalism the task of law is to bring the individual
back into the 'spirit' of things, to rehabilitate him (cf.
Berman, especially chapter on "Psychoanalysis and the Law in
the Soviet Union") while the contract notion merely demands
'payment' of what was 'promised'.
Re_ Crisan, 362 Mich., 569, 107 N. W. 2D 907.
This case and all the cases considered in this chapter can be
found in Lon Fuller and Robert Braucher, Basic Contract Law,
(St. Paul: West, 1964), p. 49.
o
Fuller and Braucher, p. 50.
o
-’The American Law Institute publishes model pro-
posals for legislation, and as in this case a summary or
restatement of law.
and Braucher, Restitution #ll6, Restatement
of Laws of Contracts, p. 50.
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v. Burge, 156 Mo. App. 286, 137 SW 618,
Fuller and Braucher, p. 366.
finding is based on the reasoning that no
gratuity was intended by the publisher, and defendant did not
argue that he thought the sending of the paper was gratuitous.
The court relies on Fogg v. Atheneum, 44 N. H. 115, and Ward
v c Powell, 3 Har. (Del.) 379. In these cases the important
facts are substantially the same. In all the cases, Austin,
Fogg, and Ward, defendants were apparently receiving the paper
at a post office and taking it home. The defendants would
have a better case had they left the paper at the post office.
In the opinion in Austin, Ellison says that there was no pre-
tense that a gratuity was intended. That there was no pre-
tense suggests that defendant's counsel may not have been
doing his job. Apparently the point that defendant could not
have thought the paper was a gratuity was conceded by counsel.
If he did concede that point, he shouldn't have; he may not
have won but he certainly would have had a better case.
■'■■'■Fuller and Braucher, p. 367.
.
.9 p. 368.
., p . 367 .
iSibid.
16of course, the 'that for which' can be a promise
as well as a service. One party makes a promise because of the
other party's action. Holmes has an interesting definition in
The Common Law ", . . it is the essence of consideration, that,
by the terms of the agreement, it is given and accepted as the
motive or inducement of the promise. Conversely, the promise
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must be made and accepted as the conventional motive or in-
ducement for furnishing the consideration. The root of the
whole matter is the relation of reciprocal conventional in-
ducement, each for the other, between consideration and pro-
mise." (Holmes, The Common Law, Boston: Little, Brown, and
Co., 1963, p. 230.)
17Hamer v. Sidway, 124 New York 538, 27 NE 256, Fuller
and Braucher, p. 188.
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by lawyers to formulate a theory of con-
tracts, a philosophical underpinning of the practice, seem
to me to be unsatisfactory. See Cohen, "The Basis of Contract,"
Harvard Law Review 46, (1933) ; Kohler, Philosophy of Law,(1914),
p. 134 and following; and other articles cited in Fuller,
Basic Contract Law, pp. 150-151. Cohen's influential article
ought to be quoted in part for its interesting and familiar
conclusion. He writes: "Contract Law is commonly supposed
to enforce promises. Why should promises be enforced? The
simplest answer is that of the intuitionists, namely, that
promises are sacred per se. ...But while this intuitionist
theory contains an element of truth, it is clearly inadequate.
No legal system does or can attempt to enforce all promises . . ."
Cohen offers no more viable account however.
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Chapter Three
Ijohn Locke, "The Second Treatise of Civil Government,
Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas Cook, (New York: Haf-
ner, 1947), p. 128.
Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Oskar Piest, (New
York: Liberal Arts, 1958), p. 139.
30ne notable exception which has not received much
attention in contemporary thinking is Rousseau's theory. See
his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality and Social Contract.
I find it surprising that a generation of radical thinkers
who subscribe to a view of human perfectability and who view
the role of institutions in society as ultimately negative,
have not made more use of Rousseau. There is at least there,
an argument and a point of view.
community goes to war. But this does not neces-
sarily mean that benefits cease to flow to individuals by vir-
tue of their membership in it.
and Braucher, Basic Contract Law, (St. Paul
West, 1964), p. 88.
for example Miller v. Miller, 78 lowa 177,
where the court refused to act on a breach related to a con-
tract between husband and wife. The court said, in part,
"
. . .
that judicial inquiry into matters of that character,
between husband and wife, would be fraught with irreparable
mischief."
7'Open-textured' comes from H.L.A. Hart, The Concept
of Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 124-132. Hart
Ts referring to a character of legal rules.
K. Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in
Recent Moral Philosophy," Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A.I.
Melden, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), p. 80
Chapter Four
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Ipiato, "The Crito," The Collected Dialogues of
Plato« ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, (New York:





6 lbid., p. 35.
7 lbid., p. 39.
Bjames Madison, The Federalist Papers, (Chicago:
Great Books Foundation, 1947), Vol. X, p. 55.
and Braucher, Basic Contract Law, (St. Paul
West, 1964), p. 50.
10ln terms of the criticism of Prichard and Ross
that they fail to set forth criteria for resolving situations
of conflict and ignorance, it must be recognized that our
criteria do not provide a catechism for resolving conflict in
all situations. No rule can be offered which will eliminate
conflict and ignorance in complex situations.
Chapter Five
4 believe therefore that the case for revolution
takes upon itself the burden of proof.
am referring to Hart's discussion of Austin's
"Province of Jurisprudence" in Hart, Concept of Law, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 18-25.
3l have paraphrased Ralph Ellison's remarks in
"Harlem is Nowhere," in Shadow and Act, (New York: Signet--New
American Library, 1953), pp. 282-289.
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